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SOFTWARE QUALITY CONTROL THROUGH FORMAL
METHOD
Jialiang Chang, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2020
With the improvement of theories in the software industry, software quality is
becoming the most significant part of the procedure of software development. Due to the
implicit and explicit vulnerabilities inside the software, software quality control has caught
more researchers and engineers’ attention and interest.
Current research on software quality control and verification are involving various
manual and automated testing methods, which can be categorized into static analysis and
dynamic analysis. However, both of them have their own disadvantages. With static
analysis methods, inputs will not be taken into consideration because the software system
isn’t executed so we do not know the behavior of the concurrent software system, while
dynamic analysis methods would be extremely expensive because of the enumeration of
inputs and paths/interleaving states of the concurrent program. In this research, the formal
method brings rigorous mathematical proof into the software quality control, to verify that
the requirements for the system being developed have been completely and accurately
specified.
This study focuses on the application of the formal method, associated with other
software verification method, including symbolic execution, fuzzing, and static analysis
methods, to verify the software vulnerabilities and security issues which negatively impact
the software quality. For the purpose of presenting the benefits of the utilization of formal
methods in software quality control, this study summarizes the research results on the

different software platforms, including memory reuse distance measurement and blockchain
smart contracts security verification on Ethereum and Hyperledger Fabric.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software quality[78] is a commonly applied standard that applied in description of the degree
of matching between the implementation of software and its initial customer requirement. The
definitions of software quality can be illustrated from different perspectives, including correctness,
robustness, security and usability. In this dissertation, software quality is representing the correctness
and security of the software, which is the main features that studied in software verification research
area.

1.1

Background

Software quality has been a huge concern in many research and industry areas. Many accidents
that related to software quality, which could-be-avoided, have happened. In order to verify its
correctness and security, software testing method is introduced conduct examinations on quality of
software, which can significantly improve the software quality. There are some fatal cases among
those casesthat happened due to vulnerabilities of software:
• A female driver got killed in a car accident caused by falure of autopilot function in 2018[11].
• The fatal overdosed radiation exposure to patients by Therac-25 medical equipment. It was
involved in at least six accidents between 1985 and 1987, in which patients were given
massive overdoses of radiation[14].
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• A notorious bug called reentrancy attack happened on Ethereum blockchain smart contract,
which caused 60 million us dollars financial loss[12].
Aforementioned and many other security issues that dangers software quality in terms of
its correctness and security. The best practical methods that can control and improve the software
quality is testing, which has been considered as an essential step of the software life cycle[77]
When the software testing[72] is introduced for the first time, all of the methods are conducted manually to control the software quality. In manual testing, people have to create specific
test cases for each software, which consumes lot of time and labors but cannot check all runtime possibilities of software exhaustively. With progressive development of research and theory, automated
software testing[54] is introduced to assist manual testing with automated methods and theories.
Automatic testing tried to replace the traditional manual testing but yet completely obsolete it at all.
This is because automated testing cannot prove all detected vulnerabilities are positively true and its
system is extremely expensive to design and implement due to highly requirement of professional
experiences. Formal method[35] is one of highly specialized mathematical based method that
applied on verifying the correctness and security of the software and hardware. In this dissertation,
I mainly focus on formal method with integration of automated fuzzing and static analysis methods
to improve the quality of different types of software.

1.2

Formal Methods in Software Quality Control

In the past, due to lack of software quality control method, it is quite difficult for software engineer
to control the software quality during the software life circle. Formal method is one of many theories
that introduced as tools to solve this issue. Formal method is fundamentally consists of three steps:
formal model abstraction, property/specification generation and property/specification checking.
Formal model abstraction will abstract the software implementation into a formal model which is
basically a model that is described by a specific type of language, such as XML[24] or Ethereum
virtual machine[29] abstract tree. However, building a formal method based software quality control
tool requires highly professional knowledge. Therefore, my research interest in throughout my Ph.D.
2

program is to develop formal method-based tools to support the debugging, analysis and verification
of complex systems, and integrated with the automated technique. I would like to introduce the
methods that are applied in this dissertation which bring universal proof of software security and
solution to improve and better control the software quality.
Formal method is a mathematical technique which integrated programming theories, aims
to construct the formal model to describe the behaviors of the software. With formal method,
constructed model can be used to fully explore and verify the software quality. Symbolic execution
is the main formal method that applied in the dissertation. Symbolic execution[61] is one of the most
widely well-accepted formal methods that applied to analyze the software quality. With symbolic
execution, program could be analyzed without worrying of concrete inputs to the software.
In order to apply symbolic execution method, symbolic variables will be inserted into
software program at the beginning. The software program will then be abstracted into a specific type
of formal method that contains path constraints, which are collected from each possible conditional
branches in the software program. Satisfiability modulo theories(SMT) constraint solver will be
applied to analyze the path constraints to check if any paths are feasible or infeasible in the software,
and generate input case or counter input example as test case. Fig. 1.1 shows a small example to
shown how symbolic execution works in analyzing the software.:
1 x = read () ;
2 if ( x == 12)
3
fail () ;
4 else
5
print ( " OK " ) ;

Figure 1.1: Symbolic execution example code

Above code snippet is an example to better illustrate the procedure of symbolic execution.
With given input of the program, x, there are two possible path that may be executed in runtime,
fail() will be executed when the value of x is exactly equal to 12, otherwise, print(“OK”) will be
executed. In manual testing, software engineer has to look inside the program in order to create test
cases to cover all runtime possibilities. However, given a more complex software, manual inspection
must require more time and labor to generate enough test cases.
With symbolic execution, the variable of x will be set as the symbolic variable. A static
3

analysis is required to capture the conditions of the selection statement, e.g. if-else statements in line
2 to line 5. In above code snippet, the captured condition is (x == 12). Once all possible conditions
are captured, SMT constraint solver will be invoked to solve the captured condition and check its
satisfiability. If there is at least one solution to the condition can be found to make this condition
satisfied, then we can guarantee the true branch, where fail() will be executed, can be executed in
runtime. Otherwise if there’s no solution existing to satisfy the condition, it thus indicates only false
branch will be executed in runtime.
The evaluation criteria for software testing method is the coverage rate. Coverage rate is the
percentage that the software is examined. There are multiple types of coverage rate to represent the
degree of the software examined in different perspectives:
• Path coverage: the coverage rate based on the number of paths checked to the total number of
paths
• Statement coverage: the coverage rate based on the number of statements checked to the total
number of statements
• Branch coverage: the coverage rate based on the number of branches checked to the total
number of branches
The most discussed topic is how to efficiently get a high path coverage rate in the analysis
process. With the developing of the software engineering, path explosion and constraint solving
effectiveness are two of the key challenges in symbolic execution research are. The more paths
explored, the more program behavior will be covered. However, the exponential growth of the
number of paths would require a lot of computation ability and tons of time. Besides path explosion
problem, the constraint solver is another bottleneck in symbolic execution. The constraints solvers
lost its ability when solving large scale program. It is a very large restriction in concurrent program
symbolic execution area. This dissertation is going to study the necessity of exhaustive path coverage
for fault detection in testing parallel program.
Besides the formal method, fuzzing and static analysis methods are also applied in controlling
the software quality in my Ph.D. researches and this dissertation.
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Fuzzing[44, 45, 86] is an automated practical testing method that is widely used in software
testing. By mutating and generating random inputs, fuzzing aims to execute the target program reasonable times in order to cover as many program paths as possible and find potential vulnerabilities.
With the same code snippet shown above, traditional fuzzing will randomly generate input as
value of x, then execute the code snippet with input. Every time an execution is finished, a random
input of x will be generated and used in next execution. The aim of fuzzing is to achieve high code
coverage through multiple program executions. However, it is difficult to cover all possibilities
of program with random inputs. Like in the code snippet above, the searching space for fuzzing
engine to generate 12 as next input is huge without knowing the condition of the selection statement
through static analysis. Thus, in order to effectively get high code coverage through fuzzing, the
static information of the program must be utilized.
Static analysis methods are a set of method that perform the software analysis and testing
to control its quality without executing the software, including control flow graph construction,
abstract syntax tree analysis, etc. It was first gradually brought into sight in 1970’s when inspection
and review of the program code is regarded as necessary part of software quality[59]. It is faster
than dynamic software analysis, which requires execution of the software. However, static analysis
has its own limitation, such as higher false positive rates than dynamic analysis.
In this dissertation, to control the software quality, I conducted researches to test and verify
the software security and correctness of different types of software with the combination of symbolic
execution, fuzzing and static analysis methods for the purpose of software quality control.

1.3

Research Domains

In this dissertation, Aforementioned formal method, fuzzing and static analysis methods are
primarily applied on software on following platforms and domains:
• Introduced a memory reuse distance measurement approach[65] that is based on randomized
executions for sequential program and a probabilistic guarantee method of observing all
possible interleaving without repeated executions for concurrency program, evaluated the
5

first one on Parsec benchmark suite and a large industrial-size benchmark MySQL, which
confirms that the randomized execution-based approach is effective and practical.
• Developed automatic verification framework[33] to test smart contract on Ethereum platform.
Framework identify paths which involve monetary transaction as critical paths and prioritize
those which potentially violate important properties. The framework is evaluated that can
capture vulnerabilities if user inspects fewer program paths and considering explicit or implicit
loops due to fallback function.
• Implemented first-in-the-world Hyperledger Fabric chaincode fuzzing test engine to verify
chaincode security issues, including detections of all types common runtime crashes and 10
types static warnings.

1.4

Dissertation Contributions

With the methods discussed in 1.2 and research domains listed in 1.3, this dissertation presents the
solutions to projects that provided in each of following platform: memory reuse distance prediction,
Ethereum smart contract security verification and Hyperledger Fabric chaincode fuzzing test.

1.4.1

Memory Distance Measurement for Concurrent Programs

Memory distance analysis, the number of unique memory references made between two accesses
to the same memory location, is an effective method to measure data locality and predict memory
behavior. Many existing methods on memory distance measurement and analysis consider sequential
programs only. With the trend towards concurrent programming, it is necessary to study the impact of
memory distance on the performance of concurrent programs. Unfortunately, accurate measurement
of concurrent program memory distance is non-trivial. In fact, due to non-determinism, the reuse
distance of memory references may differ with the same input set across multiple runs. Since
memory distance measurement is fundamental to analysis, we propose a measuring approach that is
based on randomized executions. Our approach provides a probabilistic guarantee of observing all
6

possible interleaving without repeated executions. In order to evaluate our approach, we propose a
second symbolic execution-based approach that is more rigorous but much less scalable than the
first approach. We have compared the two approaches on small programs and evaluated the first one
on Parsec benchmark suite and a large industrial-size benchmark MySQL. Our experiments confirm
that the randomized execution-based approach is effective and practical.

1.4.2

sCompile: Critical Path Identification and Analysis for Smart Contracts

Ethereum smart contracts are an innovation built on top of the blockchain technology, which
provides a platform for automatically executing contracts in an anonymous, distributed, and trusted
way. The problem is magnified by the fact that smart contracts, unlike ordinary programs, cannot be
patched easily once deployed. It is important for smart contracts to be checked against potential
vulnerabilities. In this work, we propose an alternative approach to automatically identify critical
program paths (with multiple function calls including intercontact function calls) in a smart contract,
rank the paths according to their criticalness, discard them if they are infeasible or otherwise present
them with user friendly warnings for user inspection. We identify paths which involve monetary
transaction as critical paths and prioritize those which potentially violate important properties.
For scalability, symbolic execution techniques are only applied to top ranked critical paths. Our
approach has been implemented in a tool called sCompile, which has been applied to 36,099 smart
contracts. The experiment results show that sCompile is efficient, i.e., 5 s on average for one smart
contract. Furthermore, we show that many known vulnerabilities can be captured if user inspects
as few as 10 program paths generated by sCompile. Lastly, sCompile discovered 224 unknown
vulnerabilities with a false positive rate of 15.4% before user inspection.

1.4.3

Hyperledger Fabric Chaincode Quality Control with Fuzz Testing

Since the invention of blockchain technology, both academia and industry area raised highly interests
in researching blockchain theory seeking for utilization of its high transparency and high distribution
7

features. However, the rapid development and improvement of blockchain comes with the huge
concerns of smart contract security. In this paper, we introduced a state-of-the-art software testing
approach with fuzzing formal method technique on chaincode, which is the smart contract on
the well-known blockchain platform, Hyperledger Fabric [19]. Fuzzing is a automated formal
method that is widely used in software testing. By mutating and generating random inputs, fuzzing
aims to execute the target program reasonable times in order to cover as many program paths as
possible and find potential vulnerabilities. Based on the approach, we designed the fuzzing test
tool to help chaincode user to verify the correctness of the chaincode. In our tool, chaincode that
written in golang is interpreted into abstract syntax tree format, which is abstract representation of
the chaincode. Interpreted chaincode thus is executed with inputs that are mutated and generated
based on the feed-back guidance of code-coverage and vulnerabilities that collected statistically
in previous executions. Until the a specific coverage criteria is satisfied, 10 types of chaincode
vulnerabilities checking applies and there is report that contains chaincode safety information
submitted to user. With experiment results of 24 golang written chaincodes, our tool is proved that
can correctly examine 10 types of vulnerabilities and verifies 20 real world runtime Hyperledger
Fabric chaincodes crashes in a reasonable time.

8

Chapter 2
Memory Distance Measurement for
Concurrent Programs
This chapter presents the contribution in the research: Memory Distance Measurement for Concurrent Programs. The 30th International Workshop on Languages and Compilers for Parallel
Computing (LCPC). Section 2.1 and 2.2 serves as introduction and background knowledge to the
research. In section 2.3 and 2.4, symbolic execution and random scheduling methods are introduced
in memory reuse distance measurement research area. The evaluation of the research is performed
in section 2.5. Finally, related works study and conclusion of the research are given in section 2.6
and 2.7.

2.1

Introduction

Nowadays, widespread multicore hardware has put us at a fundamental turning point in software
development. Although we have seen incrementally more programmers writing multithreaded
programs in the past decade, the vast majority of applications today are still single-threaded and
cannot benefit from the hardware improvement without significant redesign. Applications will need
to be well-written concurrent software programs in order to benefit from the advances in multicore
processors.
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Table 2.1: Memory reference of a program execution

index
Reference accessed
Memory distance

1
A
∞

2
B
∞

3
C
∞

4
A
2

5
C
1

6
C
0

7
B
2

8
A
2

9
C
2

10
B
2

11
A
2

12
C
2

13
B
2

14
B
0

15
A
2

16
C
2

The main reason to develop concurrent programs, which are much more sophisticated than
sequential programs, is to enhance the performance of an application. To achieve the performance,
developers usually make extra effort to hand tune the programs. One aspect of performance
enhancement is data locality because of its significant effect on cache. In order to manage locality,
developers need to measure the memory distance of their programs.
The memory distance of a reference is a dynamic quantifiable distance in terms of the
number of different memory references between two accesses to the same memory location [46].
It is a widely accepted concept in analyzing program cache performance. The speed gap between
the processor and memory has resulted in what is known as the memory wall. To overcome this
wall and speed up program performance, data locality is an important factor that developers must
consider. Memory distance analysis [43, 46, 47, 70] is an effective method to measure data locality
and predict memory behavior.
Much existing work on memory distance measurement and analysis considers sequential
programs only. With the trend towards concurrency, we need to do such measurement on concurrent
programs. Unfortunately, adapting existing approaches that were designed for sequential programs
is not feasible. Due to the inherent non-deterministic behavior under fixed inputs for concurrent
programs, measuring concurrent memory distance is fundamentally different from that of sequential
programs.
Consider the example shown in Table 2.1. The first row lists the indices of the events in a
program execution under input vector v. The second row gives the symbolic memory address being
accessed and the third row computes the memory distance. In the following, we use an index as
the superscript to differentiate the instances of the same memory addresses in the execution trace.
The memory distance of A1 , denoted as ∆v (A1 ), is ∞ because it is the first appearance of A. For the
same reason we have ∆v (B2 ) = ∆v (C3 ) = ∞. ∆v (A4 ) = 2 because there are two accesses to other
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memory locations between the current access and the previous access to A. Note that ∆v (B7 ) = 2,
because although there are four accesses between B2 and B7 , three out of the four access visit the
same memory location. It can be easily observed that the minimal and maximal memory distances
under v are 0 and 2 (not considering ∞), respectively. All the existing memory analysis approaches
are in general based on such computation, with minor variants 1 .
Table 2.2: Motivating example

index
Memory references in thread 1
Memory references in thread 2

1
A
C

2
B
B

3
C
A

4
A
C

5
C
B

6
C
B

7
B
A

8
A
C

However, the minimal and maximal memory distances under v may not be 0 and 2 if the
program under analysis is concurrent. For example, the trace in Table 2.1 may be from a concurrent
program with two threads as shown in Table 2.2. That is, the first eight memory accesses are from
Thread 1 and the remaining eight are from Thread 2. The execution trace in Table 2.1 corresponds
to the case where Thread 2 starts its execution after Thread 1 completes. However, this is not the
only possibility. Many other interleavings are possible, as illustrated in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Memory distance results in different interleavings

idx
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Reference accessed
{C2 , B2 , A2 ,C2 , B2 , B2 , A2 ,C2 , A1 , B1 ,C1 , A1 ,C1 ,C1 , B1 , A1 }
{C2 , B2 , A2 ,C2 , A1 , B1 ,C1 , A1 ,C1 ,C1 , B1 , A1 ,C2 , B2 , B2 , A2 }
{A1 , B1 ,C1 ,C2 , B2 , A2 ,C2 , A1 ,C1 ,C1 , B1 , A1 ,C2 , B2 , B2 , A2 }
{A1 ,C2 , B2 , B1 ,C1 , A2 ,C2 , A1 ,C1 ,C2 , B2 ,C1 , B1 , A1 , B2 , A2 }
{A1 ,C2 , B1 , B2 ,C1 , A2 ,C2 , A1 ,C1 ,C2 ,C1 , B2 , B1 , B2 , A1 , A2 }
{C2 , B2 , A1 , B1 , A2 ,C2 ,C1 , A1 , B2 , B2 ,C1 ,C1 , A2 ,C2 , B1 , A1 }
{C2 , A1 , B2 , B1 , A2 ,C1 , A1 ,C2 , B2 , B2 ,C1 , A2 ,C1 ,C2 , B1 , A1 }

Memory distance
{∞, ∞, ∞, 2, 2, 0, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 2, 2}
{∞, ∞, ∞, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2}
{∞, ∞, ∞, 0, 1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2}
{∞, ∞, ∞, 0, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 0, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1}
{∞, ∞, ∞, 0, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0}
{∞, ∞, ∞, 1, 1, 2, 0, 1, 2, 0, 2, 0, 2, 1, 2, 2}
{∞, ∞, ∞, 0, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 0, 1, 2, 1, 0, 2, 2}

This simple example illustrates the challenge in measuring memory distance for concurrent
programs. Multiple executions of a concurrent program with the same input might exercise different
sequences of synchronization events possibly producing different results each time. To obtain
accurate memory distances for a given input, all execution traces permissible under that input must
be examined. However, in current execution environments a developer has no control over the
1 For example, some approaches may report ∆

same memory locations are accessed.

7
2
v (B ) = 4 because there are four accesses between B
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and B7 regardless

scheduling of threads. Furthermore, when executing a concurrent program by running it repeatedly
on a lightly-loaded machine, the same thread interleaving, with minor variations, tend to be exercised
since thread schedulers generally switch among threads at the same program locations. The net
effect of these impediments is that only a few interleavings end up being examined. This leads to an
incomplete picture of memory distances. Even if it were possible to control thread scheduling, it
would still be infeasible to explicitly test all interleavings. For example, a program with 3 threads
and 50 lines of code per thread may have more than 1069 different interleavings. In general, the
number of possible interleavings of a multi-threaded program with n threads, each executing at most
k steps, can be as large as (nk)!/(k!)n ≥ (n!)k , a complexity that is exponential in both n and k.
There are two well accepted method to measure the reuse distance: stack based method and
tree based method. In stack based method, a stack is used for calculating reuse distance When a
program is executed and encountered an address, this address will be searched in the stack. If there
is no such address in the stack, then this new address will be pushed onto the top of the stack and
the reuse distance of this memory reference will be set to infinity. This method takes O(N) time and
is relatively slow. On the other hand, in tree based method, a tree is used to store four variables in
the structure: basic pointers to the left and right child, the memory address and the the number of
nodes under this node in the tree. This is a much more efficient algorithm and takes O(log N) time.
In this paper, we present an approach to measure memory distance of concurrent programs.
Given the fact that we cannot possibly explore all the thread interleavings of a concurrent program,
our approach introduces randomness in repeated executions. By adapting a method called PCT [26],
our approach provides a mathematical guarantee to detect memory distances of given triggering
depths. That is, if there exists a memory distance d between memory accesses to m with triggering
depth δmd (definition to be given in Section 2.4), our approach guarantees its detection with probability
d

of 1/(n × kδm −1 ), where n and k are the approximated number of threads and the approximated
number of events, respectively, of the given program. We have implemented our method in a
tool called DisConPro(Memory Distance measurement of Concurrent Programs with Probabilistic
Guarantee).
In order to validate the effectiveness of DisConPro, we propose a more rigorous but much
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less scalable approach to measure memory distance based on symbolic execution. The second
approach utilizes the symbolic execution engine that we developed to exhaustively explore all
intra-thread paths and inter-thread interleavings. We name this tool DisConSym (Memory Distance
measurement of Concurrent Programs based on Symbolic Execution Guarantee). DisConSym can
only handle small programs due to its inherent path explosion. By comparing DisConPro against
DisConSym on small programs, we are able to determine if DisConPro covers a similar memory
distance spectrum as DisConSym.
The contributions of this paper include the following:
1. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a feasible approach to measure the
memory distance of concurrent programs. Our approach is based on randomized executions
and provides probabilistic guarantees.
2. We propose a second approach that is more rigorous but less scalable than the first approach.
Although such a symbolic execution based approach can only handle small benchmarks, it
allows us to evaluate the effectiveness of the first approach.
3. We have implemented two prototypes DisConPro and DisConSym and conducted experiments
on medium-sized Parsec[23] benchmarks and a large industrial size benchmark MySQL with
DisConPro.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The background knowledge of concurrent
program execution is described in Section 2.2, followed by the explanation of our two approaches
in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. The experimental results are given in Section 2.5. Section 2.6
discusses the related work. Finally Section 2.7 concludes the paper.

2.2

Background: Execution of Concurrent Programs

Figure 2.1 gives a code snippet of a concurrent program with two threads. Depending on the values
of a and b, different branches in the two threads can be observed across executions. Depending on
the synchronization and operating system scheduling policies, different interleavings can also be
13

T 11 :a=x;
T 12 :if(a > 0) Br1 ;
else Br1 ;
T 13 :if(a % 2==0) Br2 ;
else Br2 ;
T 14 :
---- [T1] ----

< T 11 , T 21 >

< T 12 , T 21 >
Br1
< T 13 , T 21 >

Br1

< T 11 , T 22 >
Br3
Br3
< T 11 , T 23 >

< T 12 , T 22 >
Br1

Br3

Br2
Br2
< T 14 , T 21 >

T 21 :b=y;
T 22 :if(b > 0) Br3 ;
else Br3 ;
T 23 :if(b % 2 == 1) B4 ;
else Br4 ;
T 24 :
---- [T2] ----

Br1
< T 13 , T 22 >
Br2
Br3

Br4
Br4
< T 11 , T 24 >

Br3
< T 12 , T 23 >
Br1
Br4

< T 14 , T 22 >

Br2 Br3

< T 13 , T 23 >

Br3 Br2

< T 12 , T 24 >

Br4 Br1

Br3
Br2
< T 14 , T 23 >
Br4
Br4

Br1 Br4

Br4

Br1
< T 13 , T 24 >

Br2

< T 14 , T 24 >

Br2

Figure 2.1: Code snippet of a concurrent program and its generalized interleaving graph(GIG).

observed. In order to present intra-thread paths and inter-thread interleavings, we use the generalized
interleaving graph(GIG) [50, 90] to illustrate all possible executions of a concurrent program.
Figure 2.1 shows a program and its GIG. For simplicity, we assume a=x++ is atomic. The
root node (a1 , b1 ) corresponds to the starting points of the two threads. The terminal node (a5 , b5 )
corresponds to the end of the two threads. Nodes such as (a1 , b1 ) are i-PP nodes, where we can
execute either thread 1 which leads to (a2 , b1 ), or thread 2 which leads to (a1 , b2 ). In contrast,
nodes such as (a2 , b1 ) are b-PP nodes, where we can take either the assume(a = 0) branch, leading
to the code segment A1 , or the assume(a 6= 0) branch, leading to the code segment A1 .
Figure 2.1 depicts the GIG of the code snippet on its left, where black and blue edges
represent an execution step of Threads T 1 and T 2, respectively. The dashed lines with the same
source (defined as b-PP node) denote a branch within a thread and the solid lines with the same
source (defined as i-PP node) denote a context switch between two threads. Note that a node can be
both b-PP and i-PP. In order to measure memory distance accurately, all the paths in a GIG must be
considered. This is what our symbolic execution based approach, described in Section 2.7, attempts
to accomplish. However, enumerating all possible executions is obviously impractical. Thus, we
present a practical approach in Section 2.4.
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2.3

Memory Distance Measurement Based on Symbolic Execution

In this section, we present a symbolic execution based approach that is able to systematically
explore all the intra-thread branches and inter-thread interleavings. The pseudo-code is shown in
Algorithm 1, which is based on the symbolic execution algorithm proposed in [50], and follows
the Concolic [80] framework. The algorithm uses a recursive procedure T RACK S TATE to explore
paths. The first path is randomly chosen. When a new b-PP node with condition c is encountered,
T RACK S TATE checks whether the current path condition appended with c if satisfiable. If so, it
continues the execution along the branch while pushing the other branch ¬c on the stack S. The
satisfiability is checked by an SMT solver such as Z3 [38]. If the SMT solver fails to find a solution,
it indicates that no inputs or interleavings can continue the execution along the branch. In this
case, the current execution backtracks by popping its stack S. If an i-PP node is first encountered,
T RACK S TATE randomly choose one interleaving while pushing the other one on the stack. For a
more detailed explanation, please refer to [50]
The measurement of memory distance occurs during backtrack. That is, when the current
execution reaches an end state normal end state or reaches an infeasible branch. In G ET M EM D IST,
a path is treated as a sequence of member accesses hacc1 , . . . , accn i. Each acci is a pair (addr, d )
of memory address and distance. All the global memory accesses are analyzed to calculate the
memory distance. Initially the memory distance of any memory access is set to -1. The algorithm
continuously checks the next access acc j . If acc j accesses a memory address different from
acci .addr, acc j .addr is added to the set memorySet. Otherwise,the size of memorySet is the
memory distance between acci and acc j .

2.4

Memory Distance Measurement with Random Scheduling

In this section, we present our main approach that computes memory distances with random
scheduling. We begin with the concept of memory distance minimal depth δmd . Given a memory
15

Algorithm 1: SymbolicExecution(P)
let Stack S ← 0/ be the path constraints of a path;
1: T RACK S TATE(s)
2:
S.push(s);
3:
if (s is an i-PP node or b-PP node)
4:
while (∃t ∈ (s.enabled \ s.done \ s.branch))
5:
s0 ← N EXT(s,t);
6:
T RACK S TATE(s0 );
7:
s.done ← s.done ∪ {t};
8:
else if (s is an local thread node)
9:
t ← s.next;
10:
s0 ← N EXT(s,t);
11:
T RACK S TATE(s0 );
12:
path ← S.pop();
13: N EXT(s,t)
14:
let s be hpcon, M i;
15:
if ( t instanceof halt )
16:
s0 ← normal end state;
17:
GetMemDist(path);
18:
else if ( t instanceof branch(c) )
19:
if ( s.pcon is unsatisfiable under M )
20:
s0 ← infeasible state;
21:
GetMemDist(path);
22:
else
23:
s0 ← hpcon ∧ c, M i;
24:
else if ( t instanceof X = Y op Z )
25:
s0 ← hpcon, M [X ]i;
26:
return s0 ;
27: G ET M EM D IST(path)
28:
let path be hacc1 , . . . , accn i;
29:
for (int i ← 0, i < n − 1, i++ )
30:
memorySet ← 0;
/
31:
for (int j ← 1, j < n, j++ )
32:
if (acci .addr = acci .addr
33:
acci .d ← memorySet.size();
34:
break;
35:
else
36:
memorySet.insert(acc j .addr);

location m, δmd is defined as the minimal number of constraints for any pair of accesses to m that
have a memory distance of d. Consider the example given in Figure 2.4. There are four threads
with eight events e1 , . . . , e8 that access four memory locations A, B,C and D. Among the total 2520
interleavings, the memory distances between a pair of accesses to A range from 0 to 3. The memory
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Table 2.4: Four threads with eight memory accesses.

Thread1
Thread2
Thread3
Thread4
< e1, A > < e2, B > < e3,C > < e4, D >
< e5, A > < e6, A > < e7, A > < e8, A >
distance of 3 occurs only if e1 ≺ e2 ∧ e1 ≺ e3 ∧ e1 ≺ e4 , where ≺ denotes the happens-before relation.
That is, δA3 = 3 because there are three constraints.

2.4.1

PCT Algorithm

We adapt the PCT [26] algorithm that was proposed to detect concurrent bugs with a probabilistic
guarantee. The basic idea is to add a random scheduling control mechanism to randomize scheduling
to avoid redundant executions.
In [26], a concurrent bug depth is defined as the minimum number of order constraints that
are sufficient to guarantee to find the bug. The algorithm attempts to find the concurrent bug with
depth of d by controlling the thread scheduling as the following.
• The scheduling is controlled by giving each thread a priority. A thread executes only if it has
the highest priority or the threads with higher priorities are waiting.
• It assigns n initial priorities d, d + 1, d + 2....d + n − 1 to the n threads.
• It randomly picks d − 1 change points from k instructions, where k is the estimated number
of instructions. The program is then executed with the following rules.
– Each time only the enabled instruction from the thread with the highest priority can be
executed. During execution all the instructions are counted.
– If the instruction to be executed is counted as the number k-th and k is equal to any of ki ,
change the priority value of the current thread to i. This causes a context switch.
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2.4.2

Measure Memory Distance with Random Scheduling

We propose an approach called DisConPro, which adapts the PCT [26] algorithm to measure the
memory distance in concurrent programs. As demonstrated above, memory distances may be
different with different interleavings.
The basic idea of DisConPro is to measure the memory distance in multiple executions with
the PCT scheduling control mechanism. At the beginning, DisConPro generates a random schedule
following PCT [26]. Then it executes the program following the schedule. The memory distance
is measured during the execution. Each memory access is recorded in a memory access trace and
memory distances are calculated based on the memory access traces.
In practice, the statically computed scheduling is not always feasible. However, the infeasible
cases only deviate from the planned interleavings but do not lead to execution error. For example,
DisConPro may attempt to execute an instruction that is disabled by the operating system. In this
case, the execution will choose the next thread with highest priority until an enabled instruction is
found.
Algorithm 2: DisConPro(P,n,k,d,m)
1 Input: P is a program
2 Input: n is the number of threads
3 Input: k is the number of events
4 Input: d is memory distance minimum depth
5 Input: m is a memory address on which memory distance is measured
6 Var: Trace is a list that records every memory access events
7 Var: Distance is an array of memory distances
8 Distance[i] is the memory distance between i-th and (i+1)-th access to m
9 Trace = Empty List
10 Generate a random schedule S based on PCT algorithm
11 Schedule n threads based on S and execute
12 those k events
13 for each memory access event e do
14
Trace.add(e)
15 end
16 Calculate Distance based on Trace
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2.4.3

Probabilistic Guarantee Inheritance

The PCT algorithm provides a probabilistic guarantee to find a concurrent bug. By adapting it, our
approach can provide a probabilistic guarantee to find a particular memory distance d with a depth
d

of δmd . The probability is at least 1/(n × kδm −1 ). Now we now give the proof by adapting the proof
for finding a concurrent bug found in [26].
Definition 1. DisConPro(m, n, k, P) is defined as a set of memory distances of a memory object m.
DisConPro finds memory distances during one execution of program P, containing n threads and k
instructions.
Theorem 1 (Probabilistic Guarantee Theorem). If there exists a memory distance d with a minimum
depth memory distance of δmd , the probability of DisConPro finding it in one execution is
d

Pr (d ∈ DisConPro(m, n, k, P)) > 1/(n × kδm −1 )

(2.1)

Proof. We define an assert statement assert (m, d ) as that d is not the memory distance of memory
object m in the execution. We define a bug B that can be flagged if the assertion fails. If bug B is
detected, d is found as the memory distance of memory m. We define event E1 as DisConPro finds
bug B and event E2 as DisConPro finds d as the memory distance of m. Base on the definition of E1
and E2 , we can argue that E1 ≡ E2 . Let Cons be a minimum set of constraints that are sufficient
for E1 to happen. We argue that Cons is one of the minimum set of constraints that are sufficient
for E2 to happen. This bug B is not different from other concurrent bugs hidden in rare schedules.
The depth of B equals δmd , which is the size of Cons. We defineE3 as PCT algorithm find B in one
execution. Since DisConPro adapts PCT algorithm, we can argue that Pr (E2 ) = Pr (E3 ). By the
definition, we have
Pr (E1 : d ∈ DisConPro(m, n, k, P)) = Pr (E2 : DisConPro f inds B)

(2.2)

Pr (E2 : DisConPro f inds B) = Pr (E3 : PCT f inds B)

(2.3)
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It has been proved that(see[26])
d

Pr (E3 : PCT f inds B) > 1/(n × kδm −1 )

(2.4)

Then,
d

Pr (E1 : d ∈ DisConPro(m, n, k, P)) > 1/(n × kδm −1 )

2.5
2.5.1

(2.5)

Experiments
Implementation

We implement DisConPro using PIN [67], a dynamic binary instrumentation(DBI) framework that
allows users to insert analysis routines to the original program in binary form. DisConSym is
based on Cloud9 [34], a symbolic execution engine built upon LLVM [63, 64] and KLEE [30].
DisConSym has an extension for analyzing concurrent programs since Cloud9 only partially
supports concurrency. The extension of Cloud9 follows the algorithm and implementation given in
[82]. With the extension, DisConSym can analyze the interleavings not only due to synchronization
primitives, which is also supported by Cloud9, but also due to global variables. The latter is essential
and a prerequisite to analyze the memory distance of a concurrent program.

2.5.2

Comparison between DisConPro and DisConSym on Small Programs

We compare DisConPro with DisConSym to answer the following questions.
• Can DisConPro discover the same memory reuse range as DisConSym does?
• Can DisConPro cover all valid tracks as DisConSym does?
• Is DisConPro more scalable than DisConSym?
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Table 2.5: Impact of the number of global variables comparing with DisConSym and DisConPro

DisConSym

DisConPro

Thread number = 3
mem global 1
mem global 2
mem global 3
mem global 4
mem global 5
mem global 1
mem global 2
mem global 3
mem global 4
mem global 5

2 mem global
-1,0,1
-1,0,1
N/A
N/A
N/A
-1,0,1
-1,0,1
N/A
N/A
N/A

3 mem global
-1,0,1,2
-1,0,1,2
-1,0,1,2
N/A
N/A
-1,0,1,2
-1,0,1,2
-1,0,1,2
N/A
N/A

4 mem global
-1,0,1,2,3
-1,0,1,2,3
-1,0,1,2,3
-1,0,1,2,3
N/A
-1,0,1,2,3
-1,0,1,2,3
-1,0,1,2,3
-1,0,1,2,3
N/A

5 mem global
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4
-1,0,1,2,3,4

Since DisConSym is not scalable, we compare the two tools on several small concurrent
programs with an adjustable number of threads and global variables. All the programs have less
than 100 lines of code. Table 2.5 gives the experimental results. In the experiments we set the
number of threads to 3, as indicated by the heading of Column 2, and the number of global variables
to be 2-5. DisConSym is not able to handle a program with more threads and global variables.
Columns 3-6 indicate the number of global variables created in each group of experiments. Each
row in the table gives the memory distance observed for each individual global variable. When a
variable does not exist in an experiment, e.g. mem global3 in an experiment with only two global
variables in Column 3, N/A is given. In the table, the top half of the rows give the results under
DisConSym and the bottom half show the results under DisConPro. For all the experiments done by
DisConPro, we set depth to be 5 and run each program 100 times. The table indicates that memory
distances can be affected by the number of global variables. It can also be observed that for the
small programs DisConPro can find as many memory distances as DisConSym.
Although for small programs DisConSym and DisConPro generate the same results in
measuring memory distance, the cost is significantly different. Table 2.6 gives the number of paths
and time usage of the seven groups of experiments with various numbers of threads and global
variables. It can be observed that even for such small programs DisConPro is more than 1000 times
faster. As concurrent programs become larger, the gap will be wider. Although we cannot guarantee
DisConPro can detect as many memory distances as DisConSym does for non-trivial programs, we
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Table 2.6: Tracked paths and time cost result for DisConSym and DisConPro

Threads and mem global setting
3 threads, 2 mem global
3 threads, 3 mem global
3 threads, 4 mem global
3 threads, 5 mem global
2 threads, 3 mem global
4 threads, 3 mem global
5 threads, 3 mem global

Approach
DisConSym
DisConPro
DisConSym
DisConPro
DisConSym
DisConPro
DisConSym
DisConPro
DisConSym
DisConPro
DisConSym
DisConPro
DisConSym
DisConPro

# Paths
90
100
1680
100
34650
100
>200000
100
20
100
>200000
100
>200000
100

Time (seconds)
2
25
27
25
930
25
>6794
25
1
25
>9609
25
>11473
25

believe DisConPro achieves a nice trade-off between accuracy and efficiency.

2.5.3

DisConPro on Public Benchmarks

We evaluate DisConPro with 9 applications in the Parsec benchmark suite [23], as well as the
real-world application MySQL with more than 11 million lines of code. For each application, we
conduct 6 groups of experiments. Group one measures the memory distance by only running the
test cases once without scheduling control. Groups 2 to 6 measure the memory distances by running
each test case 30 times. Group 2 uses random scheduling. Groups 3-6 set the predefined depth to 5,
10, 20 and 50, respectively. For each application, we perform memory distance analysis on global
variables only. For a large application with too many global variables, we randomly choose several
global variables to measure their memory distances.
Parsec Benchmark.
Figure 2.2 gives the results of the experiments on Parsec [23]. The data in the sub-tables and
sub-figures present the range of memory distances. Each column gives the minimum and maximum
distances of all the global variables we evaluate. The figures show that in most cases the ranges
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Figure 2.2: Parsec results

that DisConPro finds are larger than those detected by Random Schedule, which in turn are larger
than the ranges discovered by Single Run. However, the range gaps achieved by PCT are not
comparable to those obtained by random algorithm or even single runs. This is because the ranges
reported in the figure are for all the global variables that we have evaluated. Assume that there
exists a global variable that is accessed at the beginning of an execution and is re-accessed before
the program terminates, its memory distance span is large and does not change much under all the
possible interleavings. In this case, this variable hides the differences of the ranges exhibited in
other variables.
For the application vips, single and random executions without PCT detect a larger memory
distance span. Since PCT randomly generates change points to enforce context switches, it may
disturb program executions significantly. For this reason, PCT may observe memory distances that
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Memory distance chart for MySQL
255799

254117

254080

255797

255774

254143

250000
200000
150000
112189
100523
100000

16 0 367 0 0
0

0x0000000000ad20c4

16 0 367 0 0

min

16 0 367 0 0

max

min

max

112523
100524

75213

51516
40141

51418
39719

min
max
One Run
16
254080

112523
100524

74804

74802

51418
39719

50000

112523
100524

112189
100524

74800

112523
100939
75212

75129

51516
40140

51821
40141

51419
40140

16 0 367 0 0

16 0 367 0 0

16 0 367 0 0

min

min

min

No PCT
16
254117

PCT_5
16
255799

max
PCT_10
16
255774

max
PCT_20
16
255797

max
PCT_50
16
254143

0x0000000000ad3780

0

100523

0

100524

0

100524

0

100524

0

100524

0

100939

0x0000000000ad62a0

3

112189

3

112189

3

112523

3

112523

3

112523

3

112523

0x0000000000b0ea44

67

74800

67

74802

67

74804

67

75213

67

75129

67

75212

0x0000000000b0f530

0

39719

0

39719

0

40141

0

40140

0

40140

0

40141

0x0000000000b10a00

0

51418

0

51418

0

51516

0

51516

0

51419

0

51821

Figure 2.3: MySQL result

are less diverse than those without PCT. This phenomenon is further amplified by the facts that
we aggregate all variables in the same figure. To understand the performance of PCT algorithms
further, we choose to illustrate the data per variable in MySQL experiments.
MySQL
Figure 2.3 gives the experimental results on MySQL. We randomly choose 6 memory objects whose
addresses are listed in the table. The figure depicts the ranges of the minimum and maximum
memory distances that we have observed from each group of experiments. It can be observed that
the memory ranges in Groups 2 to 6 are larger than that in Group 1. By comparing the results
of Group 2 to Groups 3-5, we can conclude that DisConPro is more effective than the random
scheduling algorithm. The best performance algorithms for the six memory objects are PCT 5,
PCT 50, PCT 5 or PCT 10 or PCT 50, PCT 10, PCT 5 or PCT 10, PCT 50, respectively. For
measuring the memory distances of individual variables, DisConPro can find a range that is 30%
larger than Random Schedule.
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2.6

Related Works

Cache performance heavily depends on program locality. In the past there were studies that indirectly
measure program locality by simulating its execution on a set of probable cache configurations. Such
simulations are not only time consuming but also inaccurate. In [42], Ding and Zhong proposed to
measure program locality directly by the distance between the reuses of its data because data reuse
is an inherent program property and does not depend on any cache parameters. They designed two
algorithms with one targeting efficiency and the other one targeting accuracy. Their work inspired
further improvements that exploits sampling [82] and statistical methods [46]. These methods
work well for sequential programs. However, they do not consider that non-deterministic thread
scheduling and thus not applicable to concurrent programs.
In recent years there has been research on multicore reuse distance analysis [56, 79, 92, 93].
Schuff et. al. [79] propose a sampled, paralleled method of measuring reuse distance profiles for
multithreaded programs. Whereas previous full reuse distance analysis tracks every reference,
sampling analysis randomly selects individual references from the dynamic reference stream and
yields a sample for each by tracking unique addresses accessed until the reuse of that address.
The sampling analyzer can account for multicore characteristics in much the same way as the full
analyzer. The method allows the use of a fast-execution mode when no samples are currently active
and allows parallelization to reduce overhead in analysis mode. These techniques result in a system
with high accuracy that has comparable performance to the best single-thread reuse distance analysis
tools. While our work also conducts reuse distance analysis of multithreaded programs, there exists
fundamental difference between their approach and ours. Schuff et al. focus on the hardware while
we focus on software. Their goal is to efficiently measure the distance on a more sophisticated
multicore. Thus efficiency is a major concern of their research. With the help of the their findings a
system designer may design a better cache. We aim to provide a feasible approach that measures the
reuse distance of a particular multithreaded program. Therefore non-deterministic thread scheduling
is the major concern of our work. With our approach we hope to let programmers understand the
behavior of their multithreaded programs regardless of the cache configurations. The two methods
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are orthogonal and can potentially be integrated. While we strive to diversify the executions of a
multithreaded program, the approach proposed in [79] can be used to monitor each execution.
The goal of the approaches in [56, 92, 93] are similar to that of [79]. They apply reuse
distance analysis to study the scalability of multicore cache hierarchies, with the goal to help
architects design better cache systems. In particular, Jiang et. al. [56] introduce the concept of
concurrent reuse distance (CRD), a direct extension of the traditional concept of reuse distance with
data references by all co-running threads (or jobs) considered. They reveal the special challenges
facing the collection and application of CRD on multicore platforms, and present the solutions based
on a probabilistic model that connects CRD with the data locality of each individual thread. Wu et.
al. [93] present a framework based on concurrent reuse distance and private reuse distance (PRD)
profiles for reasoning about the locality impact of core count. They find that interference-based
locality degradation is more significant than sharing-based locality degradation. Wu and Yeung [92]
extend [93] by using reuse distance analysis to efficiently analyze multicore cache performance for
loop-based parallel programs. They provide an in-depth analysis on how CRD and PRD profiles
change with core count scaling, and develop techniques to predict CRD and PRD profile scaling.
As we mentioned, our focus is to examine program behavior rather than the cache performance.
Thus we measure memory distance from a completely different perspective from [56, 92, 93].
There exists work that studies reuse distance from other perspectives. Keramidas et al. [60]
propose a direct way to predict reuse distance and apply their method to cache optimization. Zhong
et al. [96] focus on the effect of input on reuse distance. They propose a statistical, pattern-matching
method to predict reuse distance of a program based on executions under limited number of inputs.
Shen et al. [81] introduce the time-efficiency model to analyze reuse distance with time distance.
Retaining the high accuracy of memory distance, their approach significantly reduces the reusedistance measurement cost. Niu et al. [76] present the first parallel framework to analyze reuse
distance efficiently. They apply a cached size upper bound to restrict a maximum reuse distance
to get a faster analysis. Although these approaches are not optimized for multithreaded programs,
many of their ideas can potentially be adopted to extend our work.
Our repeated executions of a multithreaded program relies on PCT [26, 27], a randomized
26

algorithm originally designed for concurrent program testing. The advantage of PCT over total
randomized algorithms is that PCT provides a probabilistic guarantee to detect bugs in a concurrent
program. There has been recent work that adopts PCT for various purposes. For example, Liu et
al. [66] introduce a pthread library replacement that applies PCT to support analyzing data races
and deadlocks in concurrent programs deterministically. Cai and Yang [32] propose to add a radius
to the PCT algorithm so the revised algorithm can efficiently detect deadlocks. However, to the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply PCT in applications that are not intended to detect
concurrency bugs.

2.7

Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented an approach to measure the memory distance of concurrent
programs. Given the fact that we cannot possibly explore all the thread interleavings of a concurrent
program, our approach introduces randomness in repeated executions. By adapting the scheduling
method PCT, our approach provides a mathematical guarantee to detect memory distances of given
triggering depths.
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Chapter 3
sCompile: Critical Path Identification and
Analysis for Smart Contracts
This chapter presents the contribution in the research: sCompile: Critical Path Identification
and Analysis for Smart Contracts. 21st International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods(ICFEM 2019). At the beginning of this research, a introduction of the research topic is shown
in section 3.1. To better present the research topic, an illustrative example is given in section 3.2.
In section 3.3, the detailed approach and method to conduct the research is described. Experiment
and evaluation details are written in section 3.4. Finally, related works and conclusion are shown in
section 3.5 and 3.6.

3.1

Introduction

Built on top of cryptographic algorithms [40, 41, 57] and the blockchain technology [25, 51, 74],
cryptocurrency like Bitcoin has been developing rapidly in recent years. Many believe that it
has the potential to revolutionize the banking industry by allowing monetary transactions. Smart
contracts bring it one step further by providing a framework which allows any contract to be
executed in an autonomous, distributed, and trusted way. Smart contracts thus may revolutionize
many industries. Ethereum [91], an open-source, blockchain-based cryptocurrency, is the first to
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integrate the functionality of smart contracts. Due to its enormous potential, its market cap reached
at $26.13 billion as of Jun 11th, 2019 [15].
In essence, smart contracts are computer programs which are automatically executed on
a distributed blockchain infrastructure. A majority of smart contracts in Ethereum are written in
a programming language called Solidity [13]. Like ordinary programs, Solidity programs may
contain vulnerabilities, which potentially lead to attacks. The problem is magnified by the fact that
smart contracts, unlike ordinary programs, cannot be patched easily once they are deployed on the
blockchain.
In recent years, these attacks exploit security vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts
and often result in monetary loss. One notorious example is the DAO attack [2], i.e., an attacker
stole more than 3.5 million Ether (about $45 million USD at the time) from the DAO contract on
June 17, 2016.
The problem of analyzing and verifying smart contracts is far from being solved. Some
believe that it will never be, just as the verification problem of traditional programs. Solidity is
designed to be Turing-complete which intuitively means that it is very expressive and flexible. The
price to pay is that almost all interesting problems associated with checking whether a smart contract
is vulnerable are undecidable [89]. Consequently, tools which aim to analyze smart contracts
automatically either are not scalable or produce many false alarms. For instance, Oyente [68] is
designed to check whether a program path leads to a vulnerability or not using a constraint solver to
check whether the path is feasible or not. Due to the limitation of constraint solving techniques,
if Oyente is unable to determine whether the path is feasible or not, the choice is either to ignore
the path (which may result in a false negative, i.e., a vulnerability is missed) or to report an alarm
(which may result in a false alarm).
Besides, we believe that manual inspection is unavoidable given the expressiveness of
Solidity. However, given that smart contracts often enclose many behaviors (which manifest through
different paths), manually inspecting every path is overwhelming. Thus, sCompile further aims to
reduce the manual effort by identifying a small number of critical paths and presenting them to the
user with easy-to-digest information.
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Overall, sCompile works as follows:
• sCompile firstly constructs a control flow graph (CFG) which captures all possible control
flow including those due to the inter-contract function calls. sCompile then systematically
generates paths (with a bounded sequence of function calls).
• To address path explosion, sCompile then statically identifies paths which are ‘critical’. In
this work, we define paths involving monetary transactions as critical paths, which is often
sufficient in capturing vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
• We then define a set of (configurable) money-related properties based on existing vulnerabilities and identify all paths that potentially violate our properties. Considering that different
properties have different criticalness and a long path may be unlikely feasible than a short
one, sCompile ranks all paths by computing a criticalness score for each path based on the
two factors.
• Finally, for top ranked paths,sCompile automatically checks whether it is feasible using
symbolic execution techniques. And, the feasible paths are presented to the user for inspection.
We have implemented sCompile and applied it to 36,099 smart contracts gathered from
EtherScan [7]. Our experiment shows that sCompile can efficiently analyze smart contracts, i.e., it
spends 5 seconds on average to analyze a smart contract (with a bound on the number of function
calls 3). Furthermore, we show that sCompile effectively prioritizes programs paths which reveal
vulnerabilities in smart contracts, i.e., it is often sufficient to capture the vulnerability by inspecting
the reported 10 or fewer critical paths. Overall, sCompile identified 224 vulnerabilities. The false
positive rate of sCompile (before the results are reported for user inspection) is 15.4%, which is
also generally acceptable. A further user study result shows that with sCompile ’s help, users are
more likely to identify vulnerabilities in smart contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 illustrates how sCompile works
through a few simple examples. Section 3.3 presents the details of our approach step-by-step.
Section 3.4 shows evaluation results on sCompile . Section 3.5 reviews related work and lastly
Section 3.6 concludes with a discussion on future work.
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3.2

Illustrative Examples

In this section, we present multiple examples to illustrate vulnerabilities in smart contracts and how
sCompile helps to reveal them. The contracts are shown in Fig. 3.1.
Example 1: Contract EnjinBuyer is a token managing contract. It has 2 inherent addresses
for developer and sale. In function purchase tokens(), the balance is sent to the sale’s address. There
is a mistake on the sale’s address and as a result the balance is sent to a non-existing address and is
lost forever. Note that any hexadecimal string of length not greater than 40 is considered a valid
(well-formed) address in Ethereum and thus there is no error when function purchase tokens() is
executed. Given this contract, the most critical path reported by sCompile is one invoking function
purchase tokens(). The path will be labeled by sCompile with a message stating that the address
does not exist on Ethereum mainnet. With this, the user captures the vulnerability.
Example 2: Contract toyDAO is an invariant one of the DAO contract. Mapping credit is
a map which records a user’s credit amount. Function donate() allows a user to top up its credit
with 100 wei (which is a unit of Ether). Function withdraw() by design sends 20 wei to the message
sender (at line 1) and then updates credit. However, when line 1 is executed, the message sender
could call function withdraw() through its fallback function, before line 2 is executed. Line 1 is
then executed again and another 20 wei is sent to the message sender. Eventually, all Ether in the
wallet of this contract is sent to the message sender.
In sCompile , inspired by common practice in banking industry, assume that the user sets the
limit to be 30. Given the contract, a critical path reported by sCompile is one which executes line 0,
1, 0, and 1. The path is associated with a warning message stating that the accumulated amount
transferred along the path is more than the limit. We remark that existing approaches often check
such vulnerability through a property called reentrancy, which often results in false alarms [58, 68].
Example 3: Contract Bitway is another token management contract. It receives Ether (i.e.,
cryptocurrency in Ethereum) through function createTokens(). Note that this is possible because
function createTokens() is declared as payable. However, there is no function in the contract which
can send Ether out. Given this contract, sCompile identifies a list of critical paths for user inspection.
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contract EnjinBuyer {
address public developer = 0x0639C169D9265Ca4B4DEce693764CdA8ea5F3882;
address public sale =
0xc4740f71323129669424d1Ae06c42AEE99da30e;
function purchase_tokens() {
require(msg.sender == developer);
contract_eth_value = this.balance;
require(sale.call.value(contract_eth_value)());
require(this.balance==0);
}
}
contract toyDAO{
address owner;
mapping (address => uint) credit;
function toyDAO() payable public {
owner = msg.sender;
}
function donate() payable public{
credit[msg.sender] = 100;
}
function withdraw() public {
0
uint256 value = 20;
1
if (msg.sender.call.value(value)()) {
2
credit[msg.sender] = credit[msg.sender] - value;
}
}
}
contract Bitway is ERC20 {
function () public payable {
createTokens();
}
function createTokens() public payable {
require(msg.value > 300);
...
}
...
}
Figure 3.1: Illustrative contracts

The most critical one is a path where function createTokens() is invoked. Furthermore, it is labeled
with a warning message stating that the smart contract appears to be a “black hole” contract as there
is no path for sending Ether out, whereas this path allows one to transfer Ether into the wallet of the
contract. By inspecting this path and the warning message, the user can capture the vulnerability.
In comparison, existing tools like Oyente [68] and MAIAN [75] report no vulnerability given the
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contract. We remark that even although MAIAN is designed to check similar vulnerability, it checks
whether a contract can receive Ether through testing1 and thus results in a false negative in this case.
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Figure 3.2: Overall workflow of sCompile

3.3

Approach

Fig. 4.10 shows the overall work flow of sCompile . Firstly, given a smart contract, sCompile
construct a control flow graph (CFG) [16], based on which we can systematically enumerate all
paths. Secondly, we identify the monetary paths based on the CFG up to a user-defined bound on
the number of function calls. Thirdly, we analyze each path in order to check whether it potentially
violates any of the pre-defined monetary properties. Next, we compute a criticalness score for each
and rank the paths accordingly. Afterwards, we apply symbolic execution to filter infeasible critical
paths. Lastly, we present the results along with the associated paths to the user for inspection.

3.3.1

Constructing CFG

sCompile constructs a CFG for a smart contract (the compiled EVM opcode with a single entrance
for whole and for each function) to capture all possible paths. Formally, a CFG is a tuple (N, root, E )
such that
• N is a set of nodes, where each node is a basic block of opcodes.
• root ∈ N is the first basic block of opcodes.
1 MAIAN

sends a value of 256 wei to the contract deployed in the private blockchain network
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• E ⊆ N × N is a set of edges, where each edge (n, n0 ) corresponds to exactly a control directly
from flow n to n0 .
We also consider inter-contract functions calls, where there is a CALL to a foreign function that is
assumed to call the current function including third-part contract.
For instance, Fig. 3.3 shows the CFG of the contract toyDAO shown in Fig. 3.1. Each node
is in the form of Node m n, where m and n are the indices of the first and the last opcodes of the
basic block, respectively. The red diamond node at the top is the root node; the blue rectangle
nodes represent the first node of a function. Note that a black oval represents a node that can be
redirected to the root due to inter-contract function calls. The black solid edges represent the normal
control flow. The red dashed edges represent control flow due to a new function call, e.g., the edge
from Node 88 91 to Node 0 12. That is, for every node n such that n ends with a terminating
opcode instruction (i.e., STOP, RETURN), we introduce an edge from n to root. The red dotted edges
represent control flow due to the inter-contract function call. That is, for every node which ends
with a CALL instruction to an external function, an edge is added from the node to the root.
Given a bound b on the number of function calls, we can systematically unfold the CFG
so as to obtain all paths during which only b or fewer functions are called. For instance, with a
bound 2, the set of paths include all of those which visit Node 81 87 or Node 102 109 no more
than twice.
Statically constructing the CFG is non-trivial due to indirect jumps in the bytecode generated
by the Solidity compiler. For instance, part of the bytecode for contract toyDAO is shown as follows.
...........
92 JUMPDEST

|

.......

|

300 SHA3

93 PUSH2 0x0064

//

100

|

301 DUP2

96 PUSH2 0x0070

//

112

|

303 SSTORE

|

304 POP

99 JUMP

|
100 JUMPDEST

|

305 JUMPDEST

101 STOP

|

306 POP
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.......

|

307 JUMP

112 JUMPDEST

|

........

113 PUSH1 0x00

|

115 PUSH1 0x14

|
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|
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Figure 3.3: Control flow graph of the contract toyDAO
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Considering that Solidity compiler use templates and often introduces indirect jumps (e.g.,
PUSH), we actually construct CFGs from EVM opcode as follows:
• Disassemble the bytecode to a sequence of opcode instructions.
• Identify all basic blocks (BBL) from the opcode instructions as nodes of a CFG, where
the boundaries among BBLs are branching instructions JUMP and JUMPI, JUMPDEST, call
instructions CALL, and terminal instructions such as RETURN, STOP, and REVERT.)
• Connect basic blocks with edges (e.g., direct jumps) which are statically decided from the
opcode instructions.
• Use stack simulation to complete the CFG with edges for indirect jumps.
In the above, whenever there are indirect jumps, their targets cannot be decided by checking
the proceeding instructions and we have missing edges. These nodes are known as dangling
blocks and we introduce stack simulation to find the successor of them. Stack simulation is similar
to define-use analysis except that dangling blocks which are reachable from the entry BBL are
processed first. That is, we find all the paths from the entry BBL to the dangling blocks (e.g., the
two paths from Node 0 12 to Node 305 307) and simulate the instructions in each path following
the semantics of the instruction on the stack. Note that a dangling block ends with JUMP may
have multiple successors in the CFG. When we reach the JUMP or JUMPI in the dangling block,
the content of the top stack entry shall be determined and we connect the dangling block with
the BBL which starts at the address as in the top stack entry. For instance, for the dangling block
Node 305 307, there is only one successor Node 100 101 in both paths which is pushed by the
instruction at address 093. We repeat the above step until all dangling blocks are processed.

3.3.2

Identifying Monetary Paths

Given a bound b on the number of call depth (i.e., the number of function calls) and a bound on
the loop iterations, there are still many paths in the CFG to be analyzed. For instance, there are 6
paths in the toyDAO contract with a call depth bound of 1 (and a loop bound of 5) and 1296 with a
call depth bound of 4. This is known as the path explosion problem [18]. In this work, we focus on
the paths which are money-related to avoid path explosionhttps://github.com/Microsoft/verisol, as
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almost all vulnerabilities [20] are ‘money’-related.
A node is money-related if and only if its BBL contains any of following opcode instructions:
CALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT. In general, one of these instructions must be
used when Ether is transferred from one account to another. A path which traverses through a
money-related node is considered money-related.

3.3.3

2

Identifying Property-Violating Paths

Next, sCompile prioritizes paths that violate critical properties. The objective is to prioritize those
paths which may trigger violation of critical properties for user inspection. The properties are
designed based on previously known vulnerabilities and they can be configured and extended in
sCompile .
Property: Respect the Limit In sCompile , we allow users to set a limit on the amount of
Ether transferred out of the contract’s wallet. For each path, we statically check whether Ether is
transferred out of the wallet and whether the transferred amount is potentially beyond the limit.
To do so, for each path, we use a symbolic variable to simulate the remaining limit. Each time an
amount is transferred out, we decrease the variable accordingly and check whether the remaining
limit is less than zero. If so, the path potentially violates the property. Note that if we are unable to
determine the exact amount to be transferred , we conservatively assume the limit may be broken.
Property: Avoid Non-Existing Addresses Any hexadecimal string of length no greater than 40 is
considered a valid (well-formed) address in Ethereum. If a non-existing address is used as the
receiver of a transfer, the Solidity compiler does not generate any warning and the contract can be
deployed on Ethereum successfully. If a transfer to a non-existing address is executed, Ethereum
automatically registers a new address (after padding 0s in front of the address so that its length
becomes 160bits). Because this address is owned by nobody, no one can withdraw the Ether in it
since no one has the private key.
2 Note

that each opcode instruction in EVM is associated with some gas consumption which technically makes
them money-related. Gas[91] is the cost of any transaction that can be utilized to measure actions on Ethereum
platform. However, the gas consumption alone in most cases does not constitute vulnerabilities and therefore we do not
consider them money-related. In Fig. 3.3, we visualize money-related nodes with black background (e.g., the node
Node 112 162 with a CALL statement msg.sender.call.value(value)()).
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For every path which contains instruction CALL or SELFDESTRUCT, sCompile checks whether
the address in the instruction exists or not. This is done with the help of EtherScan Ethereum [7]
(which can check whether an address is registered or not). A path which sends Ether to a nonexisting address is considered to be violating the property. Currently, to minimize the number of
requests to EtherScan, we only query external transactions, thus may lead to false positives when
the address has only internal transactions. Of course, users can configure sCompile to also check
internal transactions.
Property: Guard Suicide sCompile checks whether a path would result in destructing the
contract without constraints on the date or block number, or the contract ownership. A contract may
be designed to “suicide” (with the opcode SELFDESTRUCT) after certain date or reaching certain
number of blocks, and often by transferring the Ether in the contract wallet to the owner. A famous
example is Parity Wallet which resulted in an estimated loss of tokens worthy of $155 million [1].
We thus check whether there exists a path which executes SELFDESTRUCT and whether its
path condition is constituted with constraints on date or block number and contract owner address.
While checking the former is straightforward, checking the latter is achieved by checking whether
the path contains constraints on instruction TIMESTAMP or BLOCK, and checking whether the path
condition compares the variables representing the contract owner address with other addresses. A
path which calls SELFDESTRUCT without such constraints is considered a violation of the property.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

contract StandardToken is Token {
function destroycontract(address _to) {
require(now > start + 10 days);
require(msg.sender != 0);
selfdestruct(_to);
}
...
}
contract Problematic is StandardToken { ... }

Figure 3.4: Guardless suicide

One example is the Problematic contract3 shown in Fig. 3.4. Contract Problematic inherits
3 We

hide the names of the contracts as some of them are yet to be fixed.
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contract StandardToken, where one of the functions is destroycontract() allowing one to destruct the
contract. sCompile can report that line 4 potentially violates the property.
Property: Be No Black Hole In a few cases, sCompile analyzes paths which do not contain
CALL, CREATE, DELEGATECALL or SELFDESTRUCT. For instance, if a contract has no money-related
paths (i.e., never sends any Ether out), sCompile then checks whether there exists a path which
allows the contract to receive Ether. The idea is to check whether the contract acts like a black hole
for Ether. If it does, it is considered a vulnerability.
To check whether the contract can receive Ether, we check whether there is a payable
function. Since Solidity version 0.4.x, a contract is allowed to receive Ether only if one of its public
functions is declared with the keyword payable. When the Solidity compiler compiles a non-payable
function, the following sequence of opcode instructions are inserted before the function body.
At line 1, the instruction CALLVALUE retrieves the message value (to be
1

CALLVALUE

2

ISZERO

3

PUSH XX

4

JUMPI

5

PUSH1 0x00

6

DUP1

7

REVERT

received). Instruction ISZERO then checks if the value is zero, if it is zero, it
jumps (through the JUMPI instruction at line 4) to the address which is pushed
into stack by the instruction at line 3; or it goes to the block starting at line 5,
which reverts the transaction (by instruction REVERT at line 7). Thus, to check
whether the contract is allowed to receive Ether, we go through every path to
check whether it contains the above-mentioned sequence of instructions. If

all of them do, we conclude that the contract is not allowed to receive Ether. Otherwise, it is. If
the contract can receive Ether but cannot send any out, we identify the path for receiving Ether as
potentially violating the property and label it with a warning messaging stating that the contract is a
black hole.
Above properties are designed based on reported vulnerabilities. Of course, sCompile is
designed to be extensible, i.e., new properties can be easily supported by providing a function which
takes a path as input and reports whether the property is violated.
To further help users understand paths of a smart contract, sCompile supports additional
analysis. For instance, sCompile provides analysis of gas consumption of paths. However, without
trying out all possible inputs, users may not be aware of the existence of certain particularly gas
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consuming paths. The gas consumption of a path is estimated based on each opcode instruction in
the path statically.

3.3.4

Ranking Program Paths

To allow user to focus on the most critical paths as well as to save analyses efforts, we prioritize the
paths according to the likelihood they reveal critical vulnerability. For each path, we calculate a
criticalness score and rank the paths according to the scores. The criticalness score is calculated as
follows: let pa be a path and V be the set of properties which pa violates.
criticalness( pa) =

Σ pr∈V α pr
ε ∗ bound ( pa)

(3.1)

where α pr is a constant which denotes the criticalness of violating property pr, bound ( pa) is the
depth bound of path pa (i.e., the number of function calls) and ε is a positive constant. Intuitively,
the criticalness is designed such that the more critical a property the path violates, the larger the
score is; and the more properties it violates, the larger the score is. Furthermore, it penalizes long
paths so that short paths are presented first for user inspection.
Table 3.1: Definition of α pr

transfer limit
Likelihood
1
Severity
2
Difficulty
2
α pr
4

non-existing addr.
1
3
2
6

suicide
2
3
3
18

black hole
3
2
2
12

To assess the criticalness of each property, we use the technique called failure mode and
effects analysis (FMEA [83]) which is a risk management tool widely used in a variety of industries.
FMEA evaluates each property with 3 factors, i.e., Likelihood, Severity and Difficulty. Each factor
is a value rating from 1 to 3, i.e., 3 for Likelihood means the most likely; 3 for Severity means the
most severe and 3 for Difficulty means the most difficult to detect. The criticalness α pr is then set as
the product of the three factors. After ranking, only paths which have a criticalness score larger
than certain threshold are subject to further analysis, reducing the number of paths significantly.
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In order to identify the threshold for criticalness, we adapt the k-fold cross-validation[39, 62]
idea in statistical area. We collected a large set of smart contracts and split them into a training data
set(10,452 contracts) and a test data set (25,678 contracts). We repeated the experiments 20 times
which took more than 5,700 total hours of all machines and optimizes those parameters.The adapted
parameters are shown in Table 3.1, and ε is set to be 1 and the threshold for criticalness is set to be
10.

3.3.5

Feasibility Checking

Not all the paths are feasible. To avoid such false alarms, we filter infeasible paths through symbolic
execution [53, 61]. The basic idea is to symbolically execute a given program.Symbolic execution
has been previously applied to Solidity programs in Oyente [68] and MAIAN [75]. In this work, we
apply symbolic execution to reduce the paths which are to be presented for users’ inspection. Only
if a path is found to be infeasible by symbolic execution, we remove it. In comparison, both Oyente
and MAIAN aim to fully automatically analyze smart contracts and thus when a path cannot be
determined by symbolic execution, the result may be a false positive or negative.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

contract GigsToken {
function createTokens() payable {
require(msg.value > 0);
uint256 tokens = msg.value.mul(RATE);
balances[msg.sender] = balances[msg.sender].add(tokens);
owner.transfer(msg.value);
}
...
}

Figure 3.5: A non-greedy contract

For instance, Fig. 3.5 shows a contract which is capable of both receiving (since the function
is payable) and sending Ether (due to owner.transfer(msg.value) at line 5), and thus sCompile does
not flag it to be a black hole contract. MAIAN however claims that it is. A closer investigation
reveals that because MAIAN has trouble in solving the path condition for reaching line 5, and thus
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mistakenly assumes that the path is infeasible. As a result, it believes that there is no way Ethers
can be sent out and thus the contract is a black hole.

3.4
3.4.1

Implementation and Evaluation
Implementation

sCompile is implemented in C++ with about 8K lines of code and is available online4 . The symbolic
execution engine in sCompile is built based on the Z3 SMT solver [37].

3.4.2

Experiment

We aim to to answer research questions (RQ) regarding sCompile ’s efficiency, effectiveness and
usefulness in practice. Our test subjects contain all 36,099 contracts (including both the training set
and the set) with Solidity source code downloaded from EtherScan. sCompile can directly take
EVM code as input and the source code is used for our manual inspection for experiment purpose.
All experiment are done on an Amazon EC2 C3 xlarge instance installed with Ubuntu 16.04
and gcc 5.4. The timeout set for sCompile is: global wall time is 60 seconds and Z3 solver timeout
is 100 milliseconds. The limit on the maximum number of blocks for a single path is set to be 60,
and the limit on the maximum iterations of loops is set to be 5, i.e., each loop is unfolded at most
five times.
RQ1: Is sCompile efficient enough for practical usage? In this experiment, we evaluate
sCompile in terms of its execution time. We systematically apply sCompile to all the benchmark
programs in the training set.
The results are summarized in Figure 3.6. In sub-table of Figure 3.6, the second, third and
fourth row show the execution of sCompile with call depth bound 1, 2, and 3 respectively.For
comparison, the fifth row shows the execution time of Oyente (the latest version 0.2.7) with the
same timeout. We remark that the comparison should be taken with a grain of salt. Oyente does
4 The

link is removed for anonymity.
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not consider sequences of function calls, i.e., its bound on function calls is 1. Furthermore, it
does not consider initialization of variables in the constructor (or in the contract itself). The next
columns show the execution time of MAIAN (the latest commit version on Mar 19). Although
MAIAN is designed to analyze paths with multiple (by default, 3) function calls, it does not consider
the possibility of a third-party contract calling any function in the contract through inter-contract
function calls and thus often explores much fewer paths than sCompile . Furthermore, MAIAN
checks only one of the three properties (i.e., suicidal, prodigal and greedy) each time. Thus, we
must run MAIAN three times to check all three properties. The different bounds used in all three
tools are summarized in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Loop bound definitions among three tools

Tool
call bound
loop bound timeout other bound
sCompile
3
5
60 s 60 cfg nodes
Oyente
1
10
60 s
N.A.
MAIAN 3 (no inter-contract)
N.A.
60 s 60 cfg nodes
In sub-table of Figure 3.6, the second column shows the median execution time and the third
column shows the number of times the execution time exceeds the global wall time (60 seconds).
We observe that sCompile almost always finishes its analysis within 10 second. Furthermore, the
execution time remains similar with different call depth bounds. This is largely due to sCompile ’s
strategy on applying symbolic execution only to a small number of top ranked critical paths. We do
however observe that the number of timeouts increases with an increased call depth bound. A close
investigation shows that this is mainly because the number of paths extracted from CFG is much
larger and it takes more time to extract all paths for ranking. In comparison, although Oyente has a
call depth bound of 1, it times out on more contracts and spends more time on average. MAIAN
spends more time on each property than the total execution of sCompile . For some property (such as
Greedy), MAIAN times out fewer times, which is mainly because it does not consider inter-contract
function calls and thus works with a smaller CFG.
The sub-figure in Figure 3.6 visualizes the distribution of execution time of the tools in
plot-box. The x-axis represents the execution time (in seconds). From the figure, we can conclude
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TABLE IV: Comparison on vulnerable contracts
Avoid non-existing address
Be no black hole
Guard Suicide

that sCompile is efficient.

alarmed
37
57
42

sCompile
true positive
32
57
38

false positive
5
0
4

alarmed
N.A.
141
66

MAIAN
true positive
N.A.
56
30

false positive
N.A.
85
36

conjecture.
TABLE V: Average number of program paths

sCompile
(Call bound=1)

call depth 1
call
depth 2
sCompile
call depth 3

sCompile
(Call bound=2)

in total
symbolic-executed to user
48.92 median(s)
37.51 timeout #1.49
6177.21
144.24
12.46
31346.62 3.106 121.231145
12.62

(Call bound = 1)
In thesCompile
second experiment,
to investigate the
8.717we aim1737
(Call of
bound
= 2) We manually inspect the critical
effectiveness
sCompile.
sCompile
paths reported
by sCompile to check whether the program
5.267
2597
Oyente
path, together
with the
associated warning message, reveals a
(Call bound
= 3)
(0.2.7)
true vulnerability
Oyente in the contract.
18.015Note that
2223not all properties
checked MAIAN
by sCompile readily signals a vulnerability. For
MAIAN
19.053limit, sCompile
1561
instance,(Suicidal)
given a user-set transfer
may report
(Suicidal)
that a program
path
may
violate
the
transfer
limit. Although
MAIAN
23.472
6186
MAIAN
such information
(Prodigal)is often useful, depending on the transfer
(Prodigal)
limit setMAIAN
by the user, the program path may or may not
19.397 a gambling
1081 contract may
signal a vulnerability. For instance,
(Greedy)
MAIAN
allow
a
user
to
place
a
bet
with
certain
amount and transfer
(Greedy)
some amount back to the user when the betting result is
revealed. In such a case, the transfer limit is likely broken
if a large bet is placed by the user. For another instance,
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
sCompile automatically reports a program path which is the
Fig. 7: execution time on sCompile vs. Oyente vs. MAIAN, most gas-consuming. Such information is useful for the user
Figure
3.6:timeout
Execution
time (e.g.,
of sCompile
vs. Oyente
with 60s global timeout, 100ms
z3 solver
and bound
to set the right
‘price’ forvs.
the MAIAN
transaction). It however
1.
does not necessarily signal a vulnerability (although it may
signal program bugs). We thus focus on those results produced
by sCompile which are directly related to vulnerabilities in
TableTo3.3:
Comparison
on vulnerable
contracts
unlike in the case of Oyente and MAIAN.
validate
the the following,
i.e., program
paths which are deemed to violate
conjecture, we count the average number of program paths property “avoid non-existing addresses”, “be no black hole”
which are analyzed through symbolic execution in sCompile.
and “guard suicide”. Note that two of the properties
(i.e., the
sCompile
MAIAN
Table V shows the results. The second column shows the latter two) analyzed by sCompile are supported by MAIAN as
alarmed
positive
false
positive
estimated total number of program paths
on averagetrue
for each
well. We
can positive
thus comparealarmed
sCompile’strue
performance
withfalse
that positive
smart
contract
which
is
successfully
tested
within
the
wall
time
of
MAIAN
for
these
two
properties.
The
results
are
shown
Avoid non-existing address
37
32
5
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
limit. Note that the estimation is based on the CFG and thus in Table IV. In the following, we discuss the detailed findings.
Be
no
black
hole
57
57
0
141
56
85
may count program paths which are infeasible. This is part
Guard
suicide
42 reported 38
30 57 contracts 36
of the reason
it is often
greater than the number
by For Property 4
2: Be no Black66Hole, there are
alternative methods like [8], [10]. The other part is that our alarmed by sCompile. We manually checked all these contracts
CFG is more complete by considering a more conservative and confirm that they are all true positives. In comparison,
inter-procedural calls. The third column shows the average MAIAN identified 141 black hole contracts and 56 contracts
3.4 shows
the statistics
oncanthe
of processed
path,43including
the estimated
total
number of Table
paths analyzed
with symbolic
execution. It
be number
among them
are true positives,
of which overlap
with
observed that only a small fraction of the program paths are sCompile’s results. We then investigate why sCompile missed
symbolically
analyzed.
the number
symboli- column),
the remaining
contracts identified
by MAIAN. We dis- (based on
number of
pathsFurthermore,
on average
(in theofsecond
the13 number
of symbolic-executed
cally executed paths remain small even when the call depth covered all of them took more than 60 seconds and thus
bound is increased. This is because only the top ranked critical sCompile timed out before finishing analyzing. When we set
CFG),paths
andare
theanalyzed
number
passedexecution.
to users.
It can
observed
that only
a small
fraction
program
by symbolic
If there
the be
timeout
to 200s, sCompile
successfully
identifies
3 more of
as the paths
are multiple program paths which potentially violate the same black hole contracts. But the other 10 are stopped by contracts
property,
sCompile prioritizes
the shorterFurthermore,
one and often avoids
mass ofofmoney-related
paths which
leads topaths
timeoutremain
at
are symbolically
analyzed.
the with
number
symbolically
executed
small
symbolically executing the longer one. The results confirm our last.
sCompile
(Call bound=3)

even when the call depth bound is increased. This is because only the top ranked critical paths are
analyzed by symbolic execution.
Table 3.4: Average number of program paths
In total Symbolic-executed To user
call depth 1 48.92
37.51
1.49
call depth 2 6177.21
144.24
12.46
call depth 3 31346.62
121.23
12.62
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RQ2: Is sCompile effective to practical usage? In the second experiment, we aim to
investigate the effectiveness of sCompile . We apply sCompile to all 36,099 contracts and manually
inspect the critical paths reported by sCompile to check whether the path, together with the
associated warning message, reveals a true vulnerability in the contract. Note that not all properties
checked by sCompile readily signals a vulnerability. We only focus on those results produced by
sCompile which are directly related to vulnerabilities in the following, i.e., paths which are deemed
to violate property “avoid non-existing addresses”, “be no black hole” and “guard suicide”. Note
that two of the properties (i.e., the latter two) analyzed by sCompile are supported by MAIAN as
well. We can thus compare sCompile ’s performance with that of MAIAN for these two properties.
The results are shown in Table 3.3. In the following, we discuss the detailed findings5 .
For Property: Be no Black Hole, there are 57 contracts in the training set are marked
vulnerable by sCompile . We manually confirmed that they are all true positives. In comparison,
MAIAN identified 141 black hole contracts and 56 contracts among them are true positives, 43
of which overlap with sCompile ’s results. For 13 missed contracts by sCompile but detected by
MAIAN, all of them took more than 60 seconds and thus sCompile timed out before finishing
analyzing.
The other 85 identified by MAIAN are false positives and 62 of them are library contracts.
We randomly choose 5 contracts from the remaining for further investigation. We find Z3 could
not finish solving the path condition in time and thus MAIAN conservatively marks the contract as
vulnerable. After extending the time limit for Z3 and the total timeout, 4 of the 5 false positives are
still reported. The reason is that these contracts can only send Ether out after certain period, and
MAIAN could not find a feasible path to send Ether out for such cases, and mistakenly flags the
contract as a black hole.
For Property: Guard Suicide, sCompile reports a program path if it leads to SELFDESTRUCT,
without a constraint on the ownership of the contract or the date or the block number, i.e., a guard to
prevent an unauthorized users from killing the contract. Among the analyzed contracts, sCompile
5 We have informed all developers whose contact info are available about the vulnerabilities in their contracts and
several have confirmed the vulnerabilities and deployed new contracts to substitute the vulnerable ones. Some are yet to
respond, although the balance in their contracts are typically small.

45

identified 42 contracts which contain at least one path which violates the property. Many of the
identified contracts violate the property due to contract inheritance as shown in Fig. 3.4.
The remaining 4 cases reported by sCompile are false positives. We manually investigated
into them and found that they are belonged two uncommon coding cases (where 3 of them are
originated from the same contract) and three of them can be detected by sCompile by slightly
revising its implementation.
MAIAN identified 66 contracts violating the property. 30 of them are true positives, 13 of
which are also identified by sCompile . The other 36 are false positives. The contract MiCarsToken
shown in Fig. 3.7 shows a typical false alarm. There are 2 constraints before SELFDESTRUCT in the
contract. sCompile considers such a contract safe for there is a guard of msg.sender == owner (or
the other condition), whereas MAIAN reports a vulnerability as the contract can also be killed if the
msg.sender is not the owner when the second condition is satisfied.
contract MiCarsToken {
function killContract () payable external {
if (msg.sender==owner ||
msg.value >=howManyEtherInWeiToKillContract)
selfdestruct(owner);
}
...
}

Figure 3.7: Ambiguous cases between sCompile and MAIAN

We further analyzed the 17 cases which were neglected by sCompile . 6 of them are alarmed
for owner change as exemplified in Fig. 3.8. In this contract, selfdestruct is well guarded, but the
developer makes a mistake so that the constructor becomes a normal function, and anyone can
invoke mortal() to make himself the owner of this contract and kill the contract.
For Property: Avoid Non-existing AddressFor the contracts in the training set, all addresses
identified are of length 160 bits. However, there are 37 contracts identified as non-existing addresses (i.e., not registered in Ethereum mainnet). They may be used for different reasons. For
example, in contract AmbrosusSale, the address of TREASURY does not exist before the function
specialPurchase() or processPurchase() is invoked (which will cost more gas for its first
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contract Mortal {
address public owner;
function mortal() { owner = msg.sender; }
function kill() {
if (msg.sender == owner) suicide(owner); }
}

Figure 3.8: Contract of owner change

user). And there are 5 addresses registered by internal transactions.
We further analyzed 25,647 contracts newly uploaded in EtherScan from February 2018
to July 2018. For “Be no Black Hole”, there are 109 vulnerabilities out of 139 alarms generated
by sCompile . Applying MAIAN on these contracts, 84 of them are marked vulnerable, 77 of
which are true vulnerabilities overlapping with those found by sCompile and 7 library contracts are
marked vulnerable mistakenly. Among the 139 contracts, 25 vulnerable ones are missed by MAIAN
according to our manual check. For “Guard Suicide”, there are 83 vulnerabilities out of 114 alarms
generated by sCompile . Applying MAIAN on these contracts, 42 are marked vulnerable, all of
which overlap with those found by sCompile . For “Avoid Non-existing Addresses”, there are 80
vulnerabilities out of 87 alarms generated by sCompile . The 7 false alarms are due to internal
transactions.
In total, sCompile identifies 224 vulnerabilities from the 36,099 contracts consisting of
46 Black Hole vulnerabilities, 66 Guardless Suicide vulnerabilities and 112 Non-existing Address
vulnerabilities.
RQ3: Is sCompile useful to contract users? Different from other tools which aim to fully
automatically analyze smart contracts, sCompile is designed to facilitate human users. We thus
conduct a user study to see whether sCompile is helpful to them.
The study takes the form of an online test. Once a user starts the test, first the user is
briefed with necessary background on smart contract vulnerabilities (with examples). Then, 6 smart
contracts (selected at random each time from a pool of contracts) are displayed one by one. For
each contract, the source code is first shown. Afterwards, the user is asked to analyze the contract
and answer the two questions. The first question asks what is the vulnerability the contract has.
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The second question requires user to identify the most gas consuming path in contract (with one
function call).
For the first three contracts, the outputs from sCompile are shown alongside the contract
source code as a hint to the user. For the remaining 3 contracts, the hints are not shown. The
contracts are randomized so that not the same contracts are always displayed with the hint. The
goal is to check whether users can identify the vulnerabilities correctly and more efficiently with
sCompile ’s results.
We distribute the test through social networks and online professional forums. We also
distribute it through personal contacts who we know have some experience with Solidity smart
contracts. In three weeks we collected 48 successful responses to the contracts (without junk
answers)6 . Table 3.5 summarizes the results. Recall that sCompile ’s results are presented for the
first three contracts. Column LOC and #paths shows the number of lines and paths in each contract.
Note that in order to keep the test manageable, we are limited to relatively small contracts in this
study. Columns Q1 and Q2 show the number of correct responses (the numerator) out of the number
of valid responses (the denominator). We collect the time (in seconds) taken by each user in the
Time column to answer all the questions. In the end of the survey we ask the user to give us a score
(on the scale of 1 to 7, the higher the score the more useful our tool is) on how useful the hints in
helping them answer the questions. The value in column Usefulness is the average score over all
responses because all responses are shown half the hints.
Table 3.5: Statistics and results of surveyed contracts
Contract
C1 (w)
C2 (w)
C3 (w)
C4 (w/o)
C5 (w/o)
C6 (w/o)

LOC
33
52
67
87
103
107

#paths
8
16
38
59
13
27

Q1
7/8
7/8
7/8
2/8
3/8
4/8

Q2
3/8
2/8
2/8
1/8
1/8
1/8

Time
119
98
233
414
397
420

Usefulness

5

The results show that for the first three contracts for which sCompile ’s analysis results are
shown, almost all users are able to answer Q1 correctly using less time. For the last three contracts
6 There

are about 80 people who tried the test. Most of the respondents however leave the test after the first question,
which perhaps evidences the difficulty in analyzing smart contracts.
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without the hints, most of the users cannot identify the vulnerability correctly and it takes more
time for them to answer the question. For identifying the most gas-consuming path, even with
the hints on which function takes the most gas, most of the users find it difficult in answering the
question, although with sCompile ’s help, more users are able to answer the question correctly. The
results show that gas consumption is not a well-understood problem and highlight the necessity of
reporting the condition under which maximum gas consumption happens. All the users think our
tool is useful (average score is 5/7) in helping them identify the problems.

3.5

Related Works

sCompile is related to existing work on identifying vulnerabilities in smart contracts that can
be roughly categorized into 3 groups according to the level at which the vulnerability resides
at: Solidity-level, EVM-level, and blockchain-level [20? ]. In addition, existing work can be
categorized according to the techniques they employ to find vulnerabilities: symbolic execution [36,
55, 68, 75, 87], static-analysis based approaches [88] and formal verification [22, 58]. Our approach
works at the EVM-level and is based on static analysis and symbolic execution, and is thus closely
related to the following work.
Oyente [68] formulates the security bugs as intra-procedural properties and uses symbolic
execution to check these properties. However, Oyente does not perform inter-procedural analyses to
check inter-procedural or trace properties as did in sCompile .
MAIAN [75] is recently developed to find three types of problematic contracts in the
wild: prodigal, greedy and suicidal. It formulates the three types of problems as inter-procedural
properties and performs bounded inter-procedural symbolic execution. It builds a private testnet
to valid whether the contracts found by it are true positives by executing the contracts with data
generated by symbolic execution. However, sCompile differs from MAIAN in following aspects.
First, sCompile makes a much more conservative assumption about a call to third-party contract
which we assume can call back a function in current contract. sCompile is designed to reduce
user effort rather than to analyze smart contracts fully automatically. Secondly, sCompile supports

49

more properties than MAIAN. Thirdly, sCompile checks properties in ways which are different
from MAIAN. sCompile treates the value used for a transaction as symbolic variable and does not
introduce false negatives. For checking suicidal contracts, MAIAN performs symbolic execution
and generates inputs to trigger the suicide of the contract in the validation phase; sCompile checks
guardless suicide with either ownership checking or date checking which are often hard for SMT
solver to generate values. Other symbolic execution based tools [36, 87] perform intra-procedural
symbolic analysis directly on the EVM bytecode as what Oyente does.
The tool Securify [88] is based on static analysis to analyze contracts. It specifies both
compliance and violation patterns for the property. The vulnerability detection problem is then
reduced to search the patterns on the inferred data and control dependencies information. The use
of compliance pattern reduces the number of false positives in the reported warnings. In the ranking
algorithm, our approach rely on syntactic information to reduce paths for further symbolic analysis
to improve performance. We analyze the extracted paths with symbolic execution which is more
precise than the pure static analysis as adopted by Securify.
Other attempts on analyzing smart contracts include formal verification using either modelchecking techniques [58] or theorem-proving approaches [22]. They in theory can check arbitrary
properties specified manually in a form accepted by the model checker or the theorem prover.
It is known that model checking has limited scalability whereas theorem proving requires an
overwhelming amount of user effort.

3.6

Conclusion

We proposed a practical approach named sCompile to reveal “money-related“ paths in smart
contract and to further detect vulnerabilities among critical ones. In our experiment among 36,099
smart contracts, it detected 224 new vulnerabilities. All the new vulnerabilities are well defined in
our approach and could be presented to the user in well-organized information within a reasonable
time frame. A comparison with two existing approaches also demonstrated that sCompile is both
efficient and effective.
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Chapter 4
Hyperledger Fabric Chaincode Quality
Control with Fuzz Testing
This chapter presents the contribution in the research about Hyperledger Fabric chaincode quality
control with fuzz testing method. At the beginning, introduction of the research topic and a
motivating example is shown in section 4.1 and 4.2. After that, in section 4.3, the entire fuzzing
approach is described in 5 steps and the details of these steps are completely described. The
vulnerabilities detection analysis is illustrated in section 4.4. In order to evaluate the research project
performance, a well designed experiment and its result evaluation is shown in section 4.5. At last,
related works and conslusion is given in section 4.6 and 4.7.

4.1

Introduction

Smart contract is an revolutionary software category built upon the blockchain platform, which has
been well-accepted in documentation keeping and broadcasting messages that introduced in recent
decade. Smart contract is designed as a programmable and safe implementation for the purpose of
satisfying user’s requirements, such as voting and trading cryptocurrency. However, in most recent
years, there are plenties of attacks that caused huge economic losses. The notorious DAO attack
make the Ethereum owner suffer a loss of $ 60M. More hazardously, the same type of attack that
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had been discovered and happened, which cannot be prevented completely.
Hyperledger Fabric is a promising blockchain platform that maintained by Linux foundation.
It has great features on distribution and privacy which are the reason of being widely accepted and
applied in business industry. It’s smart contract, chaincode, designed with upgradeable and high
maintainable status, which is also extensively utilized and integrated into the business system.
With the development and adoption of Hyperledger Fabric, there’s incremental demands for
the security analysis. However, the security of Hyperledger unfortunately, hasn’t not gain much
attention from neither industry nor research area. Noticing this surging security requests and driven
by curiosity of software security research on chaincode, we developed an approach for automated
analyzing chaincode vulnerabilities with fuzz testing, which is proved as a quality software testing
technique to discover software security issues.
To the best of our knowledge, we didn’t find any effective fuzzing analysis tool that can
truly verify chaincode security issues and detect chaincode vulnerabilities and crashes. There
are researches[3, 94] that focused on static analysis for Hyperledger Fabric chaincode. However,
there’re natural limitations to statically analyze program as static analysis cannot prove the found
warnings really exist in runtime or could lead to runtime bug in practical. Moreover, static analysis
also bring high amount of false positive and false negative in analysis result.
Besides static analysis, fuzzing is another widely used software testing technique in practical
industry. Building a efficient fuzzer is quite challenging due to following difficulties:1, difficulty
to generate new inputs; 2, difficulty to create a execution method for specific type of program;3,
difficulty to achieve high coverage rate and 4, difficulty to reveal potential vulnerabilities in test
result. In order to efficiently utilize fuzzing technique in chaincode testing, our approach take above
difficulties into considerations and is implemented into afuzzer , which is modularized fuzzer that
handled difficulties to guarantee figure out any potential warnings and security issues that hidden
inside the chaincode. afuzzer inherits advantages from go-fuzz [6], which is well-known golang
program fuzzer, and extensively adopts feed-back seed mutation strategy and static analysis on
chaincode security issues. This make afuzzer a first and unique Hyperledger Fabric chaincode
fuzzer to bring insight to chaincode developer with signals and alerts of when and how they should
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start focusing on verify security of chaincode in order to increase the software quality.
afuzzer is designed and implemented based on go-fuzz, which collected wisdom of American
fuzzy lop(AFL)[9]. Besides the inherited fuzzing architecture, afuzzer integrate chaincode static
analysis from previous researches[3, 94], and improved and extended their chaincode security
definitions to further increase the analysis accuracy on chaincode security issues. In order to prove
the correctness and efficiency of afuzzer , 24 chaincodes are systematically analyzed with the tool.
As experimental result, afuzzer can finish all Hyperledger Fabric chaincode analysis with 1 minute
and 10 minutes wall time each to reveal all pre-defined chaincode warnings, which are in total of 52
chaincode warnings. At the same time, 20 runtime crashed are found amount these chaincodes, and
those that related to official Hyperledger Fabric projects had been reported.
Our main contributions in this article are
• Design fuzzing approach to reveal chaincode vulnerability warnings and runtime chaincode
crashes.
• Integrate existing chaincode static analysis as module to enhance fuzzing test process. Static
analysis module can optional be stand-alone analysis module during or after the fuzz execution.
• Improved existing chaincode static analysis with more accurate chaincode vulnerability
warnings definitions.
• Design input mutation seed prioritizing algorithm with factors of static analysis result and
functions which had been fuzzed at runtime.
• Implementation of afuzzer based on fuzzing approach, which is state-of-the-art distributed
Hyperledger Fabric chaincode test platform.
• Evaluation of afuzzer with opcode sourced chaincodes. This proves correctness and efficiency
of afuzzer
We organized the paper as follows. In Section 4.2, we present how afuzzer works through a
motivating example. In Section 4.3 we show the details of fuzz testing that containing inside the
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afuzzer . Section 4.5 illustrate the implementation of afuzzer and shows the results on experiment
and evaluating afuzzer . Then section 4.6 reviews related work. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes the
paper.

4.2
4.2.1

Motivating Example
Chaincode

Hyperledger Fabric chaincode is a smart contract program designed to interactive with ledger state
of Hyperledger Fabric blockchain. It can be implemented with various kinds of languages including
Go, Java and Node.js. Chaincode runs on peer nodes of blockchain and is called to initial or invoke
transactions to update the status of ledger and assets. A typical chaincode is as following:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

import (
" github . com / hyperledger / fabric / core / chaincode / shim "
pb " github . com / hyperledger / fabric / protos / peer "
)
type Chainco deAsset struct {}
func ( t * Chainc odeAsset ) Init ( stub shim . C h a i n c o d e S t u b I n t e r f a c e ) pb . Response {
// statements
}
func ( t * Chainc odeAsset ) Invoke ( stub shim . C h a i n c o d e S t u b I n t e r f a c e ) pb . Response {
// statements
}

Figure 4.1: Chaincode necessary interfaces

As shown in Fig. 4.1, to implement a chaincode, there are two interfaces(shows in Fig. 4.1),
Init and Invoke, must be implemented in the chaincode. After that, the chaincode can be installed
on the peer node and called through these two implemented functions when user would like to
create new transactions. Please note that there are only Init and Invoke can be called through the
commands of Hyperledger Fabric whereas in Ethereum, each functions can be called from external
call independently in Ethereum smart contract. In this setting, in order to call other functions in the
Hyperledger Fabric chaincode, these functions have to be called through Init and/or Invoke function.
The commonly method is implement a selection statement to control which function to be called by
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setting with different values of input arguments.
Being shown the chaincode skeleton, we shows a motivating example to further explain how
warning and crash hide inside the chaincode and revealed by our approach.

4.2.2

Motivation Example

In this section, we first introduce the basic of Hyperledger Fabric chaincode. Then we show a
illustrative chaincode example that contains chaincode security warnings and implicit runtime crash,
and the steps how our approach analyze the example and reveal all warnings and crashes.
During the research process of Hyperledger Fabric chaincode(smart contract), we found
vulnerabilities in several examples that come with the Hyperledger Fabric Software Development
Kit(SDK) and thus motivated by them. In order to illustrate what our approach can analyze, we
designed following chaincode based upon example04.go, one of Hyperledger Fabric SDK official
example1 .
Warning and Crash: In the chaincode in Fig. 4.2, there are 4 functions: Init, Invoke, query, and
toChaincodeArgs. Among these 4 functions, Init, Invoke and query are methods that designed for
ME struct, which is short name of Motivating Example. According to the design requirement of
chaincode, Init and Invoke are the functions that must be implemented based upon the Hyperledger
Fabric chaincode interface. The difference between them is that Init will only be called once when
chaincode’s initialization and Invoke could be called multi-times when every time the chaincode
is invoked after initialization. Besides these two functions, query is the function to call another
chaincode with a set of given arguments formalized with help of toChaincodeArgs function. Please
note that the shim.ChaincodeStubInterface is the chaincode required argument for any function in
the chaincode, but not necessary to be assigned to the function when invoking any function of the
chaincode other than Init and Invoke.
In the motivating example, there are 2 warnings and 1 crash hidden inside:
• The first warning is at line 13 where the length of args is not checked and could cause
1 Found

crashes in example04.go as well as other 4 vulnerable chaincodes have been reported to Hyperledger Fabric
bug bounty website (https://hackerone.com/hyperledger)
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package M o ti v a t i n g E x a m p l e
import (
" strconv "
" github . com / hyperledger / fabric / core / chaincode / shim "
pb " github . com / hyperledger / fabric / protos / peer "
)
type ME struct {}
func ( t * ME ) Init ( stub shim . C h a i n c o d e S t u b I n t e r f a c e ) pb . Response {
_ , args := stub . G e t F u n c t i o n A n d P a r a m e t e r s ()
event := args [0] // warning 1
eventVal , _ := strconv . Atoi ( args [1]) // warning 2
err := stub . PutState ( event , [] byte ( strconv . Itoa ( eventVal ) ) )
if err != nil {
return shim . Error ( err . Error () )
}
return shim . Success ( nil )
}
func ( t * ME ) Invoke ( stub shim . C h a i n c o d e S t u b I n t e r f a c e ) pb . Response {
function , args := stub . G e t F u n c t i o n A n d P a r a m e t e r s ()
if function == " query " {
return t . query ( stub , args )
}
return shim . Error ( " Invalid function name " )
}
func ( t * ME ) query ( stub shim . ChaincodeStubInterface , args [] string ) pb . Response {
if len ( args ) > 3 {
c ha in Cod eT oC al l := args [1]
queryKey := args [2]
channel := args [3]
invokeArgs := to Ch a in co de A rg s ( " query " , queryKey )
// crash if input is {" Args ":[" query " ," a " ,"" ,"" ,""]}
stub . In vo k eC ha in c od e ( chainCodeToCall , invokeArgs , channel )
}
return shim . Success ([] byte ( " Query success " ) )
}
func t oC ha in c od eA r gs ( args ... string ) [][] byte {
bargs := make ([][] byte , len ( args ) )
for i , arg := range args {
bargs [ i ] = [] byte ( arg )
}
return bargs
}

Figure 4.2: Motivating example

uncheckedArgument warning since a none exist member of array may be called. If the input
to Init is {”Args” : []}, then args[0] may lead to an out of bound error if there’s no member
in the array of args[0]
• The second warning is at line 14 which is a unhandledError warning. The trigger input to
this warning could be {”Args” : [””, ”string”]}. The return value of eventVal will be 0 if the
value of args[1] is a non-integer string. To prevent this, the second return value of function
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strcvonv.Atoi, which is an error, should be handled correctly in order to make sure the value
that stored into the ledger is correct in line 15.
• The crash happens at line 37. When the invoke argument set to {”Args” : [”query”, ”a”, ””, ””, ””]},
the Invoke function will be called and argument will be parsed by the method GetFunctionAndParameters. After the execution of line 23, the value of function will be assigned with query.
The values of args will be {”a”,””,””,””} and then passed into function query. After that, the
args pass the if statement in line 32 in function query and second element of args(arg[1]) will
be assigned to variable chainCodeToCall. Since the value that assigned to chainCodeToCall is
null, thus there is error in call stub.InvokeChaincode as chainCodeToCall is its first argument
and cannot be null. In this crash, the length of args is guarded by line 31, which can prevent
following statements from unhandledError warnings. However, there’s still a crash at line 37.
This crash informs us that: A warning may not have to cause a crash and a crash may happen
even if the warning has been proved.

Approach Steps: In order to detect all implicitly existing crashes and expose warnings that may
lead to crashes, our approach is inspired from [49] and fuzzing test the Hyperledger Fabric chaincode
with following 4 main steps:
1. The first step is to generate required policy file. The policy file will be used as the entry
of the fuzzing test and assist to validate the mutated-generated input to each chaincode execution.
As shown in Fig. 4.3, there is a snippet of a policy file generated based on aforementioned
chaincode in Fig. 4.2. There are 3 functional steps implemented in the policy: filter invalid fuzzgenerated inputs (line 2-11), parse fuzz-generated inputs into correct format(line 12-21) and invoke
chaincode with inputs (line 23-27). With policy file, our approach can feed mutated-inputs through
policy file to the chaincode, and avoid the warnings and crashes that caused by the illegal format of
inputs. Please note that we applied Mock API comes with Hyperledger Fabric SDK to test each
single execution of targeted chaincode since our approach aims to provide an efficient method
to fuzzing test chaincode. In this case, our approach tries best to simulate the practical running
environment of chaincode and ignored the illegal inputs which will be handled in practical runtime
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environment of Hyperledger Fabric blockchain. That’s the reason our approach considered and
ignored any malicious activities caused by the illegal inputs as they won’t happen in the runtime.
More details will be given in section 4.3.
2. The second step is to construct the control flow graph of chaincode. To figure out
if there’s any implicit warnings in the chaincode, there are two criteria needed to check: path
information for each unique path and path that are executed in runtime. For the uniqueness of each
path and to collect path information, it is necessary to build the CFG as reference of the chaincode
execution.
The CFG is built statically based on chaincode abstract syntax tree before the chaincode is
instrumented. Fig. 4.4 shows the control flow graph of chaincode in Fig.4.2.
Note that there are only two functions that can be called externally: Init and Invoke. The
difference of these two functions is that Init function can only be called once when the chaincode is
deployed on Hyperledger Fabric blockchain. On the other hand, Invoke could be called every time
chaincode is invoked with inputs. This is due to design of chaincode and will affect the control flow
graph that shows in 4.4
In Fig. 4.4, it shows all 5 paths that could be executed during the fuzz testing procedure.
The CFG consists of Nodes and Edges. There are 4 types of Node: The diamond node with lines
inside is the root node, which represents the beginning of chaincode execution. The diamond node
without inside lines are for Init and Invoke function as these two functions are entry of the chaincode
when it is called. The ellipse node represents the basic blocks in the function and finally, the square
node is the terminal node, which is last node and exit of the function. If there’s relations between
two nodes, they are connected with Edge. If one node is the start node of two edges, it shows this
specific node has branches that may lead to different child nodes.
Since the call to chaincode can only be through Init and Invoke, we thus categorize these
paths into two call processes. In call process 1, path information that starts with function call Init
will be collected. Meanwhile, information of warning 1 and warning 2 will be also collected and
could be detected potentially if the paths that includes line 13 and line 14 are executed in later steps.
Similarly, our approach collects path information in call process 2 to analyze any path that walk
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through Invoke function and monitor if any information are related to potential warnings and crashes.

3. The third step is to instrument source code of chaincode into instrumented program.
Our approach walk through abstract syntax tree(ast) of the each file that are consists of target
chaincode. The comments are trimmed and a customized label is added into source code and
form the instrumented chaincode. For each block of ast, a CoverTab size is given in front of the
beginning of the block as instrumentation information. This information will be used to analyze
path information as well as coverage rate in following steps. The code snippet of instrumented
source code of motivating chaincode example is shown in Fig. 4.5.
4. In the fourth step, instrumented program then is feeded with fuzzing-generated inputs and
executed. In each time of execution, if the new mutated input triggers and discovers a new path,
then this specific execution path and its associated data will be recorded. This is because every time
the different input is feeded into the program, the executed chaincode path may (or not) be same
path. Next we could start the execution process and waiting until the wall time or desired paths
information are collected. Ideally, all feasible paths are tracked in a given time and fuzzing step can
then be terminated.
The aim of step four is to reveal all implicit warnings and generate test cases for any potential
crashes in maximized number of covered branched in the chaincode in efficient way. Towards
this aim, we designed algorithm to guide seed mutation with feed-back of every previous history
chaincode execution record. Feed-back algorithm take given input as initial seed, prioritize the seed
which is most promising in mutating new input that can discover new branch in each execution,
and generate new input based on selected seed. This algorithm repeatedly monitor the fuzzer to
guarantee efficiency of fuzzer until fuzzer’s termination.
In the motivating example, we thoroughly present the entire procedure of our approach step
by step. In next section, the technical details about our approach will be illustrated in each step.
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4.3

Fuzzing Test Approach

In this section, we introduce our state-of-the-art fuzz testing method for Hyperledger Fabric
chaincode in details.

4.3.1

Fuzzing Policy Generation

As first step, the target chaincode will be given as input to create policy file, which will contain the
necessary data that need by fuzzer in following steps, such as the number and the types of variables
that accepted by chaincode. Moreover, a specific template will be applied to generate a policy file
which can thus be recognized as fuzzing configuration used by following steps.
However, there are challenges in generating a well-formed, meaningful policy file.
• How to design an entrance to accept input that in the form that chaincode can accept?
• How to invoke chaincode with given input in policy file?
With such consideration, a fuzzing policy is generated with 2 functional parts: a validator for input
and interface to call chaincode with given input.
As any inputs will be considered as data in form of []byte due to the versatility consideration
of go-fuzz. We adopted the idea of go-fuzz [6] in which there’s a Fuzz function working as start
point and takes all possible inputs that generated through afuzzer in format of []byte, like the
variable data in line 1 of code snippet in Fig. 4.3.
According to design of the chaincode, each chaincode must implement two interfaces, Init
and Invoke. Init will be invoked when chaincode is initialized or upgraded. The Invoke function is
called when chaincode is invoked to process transaction. As the nature of handling multiple functions
as a program and only Invoke could be the entry of the chaincode after chaincode initialization, it is
non-deterministic for any fuzz input generator to generate a valid invoke input automatically at the
beginning of the chaincode test. The format of input of chaincode must strictly follow a specific
JSON [10] format. In Fig. 4.6, the snippet of Invoke function shows there are only three types of
input set can successfully call private functions. For example, input {”Args”:[”invoke”,args...]}
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will lead the snippet to walk through line 3 and 4 while {”Args”:[”query”,args...]} will guide
chaincode to the line 7 and 8. However, invalid inputs like {”Args” : [”update2”, ”a”, ”200”]} or
{”Args2” : [”query”, ”a”, ”200”]} may also be generated by fuzzer and passed to chaincode during
fuzzing process if there’s no policy file to filter them, which will eventually decrease fuzzer’s
efficiency.
Thus, a validator is integrated in the policy file, such as line 2 to line 2 in the policy file in
Fig. 4.3, which only allow the input with format that accepted by chaincode pass.
Once the input argument is validated and parsed, Mock API is utilized to simulate chaincode
execution procedure. Taking Fig 4.3 as example, the chaincode object is created at line 23 and the
internal state map of chaincode is initialized through the constructor at line 24. At line 26, there’s
an optional code to apply to invoke the Init before Invoke if the Invocation of the chaincode depends
on the status of initialization. Otherwise, chaincode could be invoked through line 27 directly.

4.3.2

CFG Generation

After the setup of fuzz policy file and initial corpus, a control flow graph(CFG) [17] is necessary to
guide the path data analysis. A CFG consists of 3 elements: nodes, edges and relations between
nodes and nodes. Given a chaincode, the CFG will contain all possible chaincode paths information.
Given a chaincode, there are only two functions, Init and Invoke, can be invoked by external
calls. We thus construct a graph starts from a abstract root node (representing a function call for
initializing variables). Then there are always two nodes, Init and Invoke, are connecting to the
root node. The Invoke node is then connected to nodes representing calling of any of the private
functions. Each private function f is then analyzed such that if it calls a function f 0 , there is an edge
from f to f 0 . Any function which can terminate without calling another function is connected to
every child of the root node, which allows a sequence of call of the private functions. Note that the
paths that identified in CFG may not be all feasible in runtime since it is unknown to figure out the
branch conditions of chaincode statically.
We take advantage of methods of go/ast function provided by golang to get necessary data to
contract CFG by default. The algorithm of CFG construction is presented as shown in algorithm 3
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm constructCFG
1 Let G = (N, root, E ) be an empty control flow graph
2 Let source be source code of chaincode
3 Let AST be abstract tree of chaincode
4 AST = gen ast (source)
5 Blocks = parse blocks(AST )
6 while block ∈ Blocks do
7
while stmt ∈ block do
8
N = update n(N, stmt )
9
E = update e(E, N, stmt )
10
if stmt = f st then
11
root = add r (N, stmt )
12
end
13
end
14 end
15 G = update g(G)
The generation of CFG happens statically before the instrumentation of chaincode. Since
the statically process, the CFG is over-approximated comparing with the CFG that constructed
dynamically in some cases. For example, there may be only one branch(if branch) could be tracked
for a selection statement(if-else-if branches) when CFG is built dynamically with certain input.
Such as example in 4.7, else-if branch will not be tracked dynamically as the square of input i is
always greater than or equal to 0, which, however, could be added to CFG since effect of input will
not be considered if CFG is built statically. To sum up, the CFG built is an over-approximation of
the set of reachable paths of chaincode in runtime.

4.3.3

Instrumentation

The third step is chaincode instrumentation. In this step, we adopted go-fuzz solution. Original
chaincode and policy file will be given into instrumentation module. Instrumentation module will
insert a label for each line and column of code and a instrumented source code of chaincode will be
created.
During the procedure of instrumentation, there two types of instrumentation, cover and
sonar. Cover instrumentation is for coverage measurement purpose. It will be generated to guide

62

the process of fuzzing and keep the information of tracked paths. And sonar is to find out all the
comparison operations in source code code. When there’s comparison operation happens, intercept
will keep and pass it into runtime. The purpose of sonar instrumentation can help to mutate the
input more effectively with the current input.
As shown in Fig. 4.8, there are two possible paths for the code snippet. One will go with
return ”Error” when v1 is not equal v2 and another one will go with return ”Success”. Assuming
the current fuzz input is v1 and v1 is not equal to v2, the current tracked path is going with return
”Error”. If we choose to randomly generate another fuzz input, it probably won’t track another path
since a new v1 may still not equal to v2. Sonar instrumentation can help to replace the v1 with v2’s
value from the chaincode and force tracking another path, which will go with return ”Success” in
next execution.
Eventually, the instrumentation and source code of chaincode will be passed to the next
Execution step.

4.3.4

Feedback Guided Fuzzing Mechanism

With instrumented source code of chaincode, execution module will start the fuzzing execution.
During the execution step, the most distinguished secret to specific fuzzing engine is its input
feed-back guidance. As to our approach, we designed the algorithm to select the seed which will
most likely discover new path on top of two-level input mutation strategy inherited and extended
from go-fuzz, aiming to achieve a high coverage rate.
The overall work flow of execution is shown in algorithm 4. The input of the algorithm is a
set of initial input seed, which is represented as S. With the input, the expecting output are a result
set for crashes, C, a result set for warnings, W , and a result set for input seed, which is updated S set.
A candidate input seed, cand, will be randomly picked from the initial input seed S at the beginning,
and algorithm iteratively execute the chaincode and update every candidate input with two-level
mutation strategy, computeMinimization and computeMutation respectively, until pre-set time is
out or is manually terminated. At line 8, cand is feeded into instrumented chaincode, and generate
a set of crash c, a set of warning w and a set of path information i as results. All of these three sets
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Algorithm 4: Fuzzing execution
1 Let C be an empty set for crashes
2 Let W be an empty set for warnings
3 Let S be initial input seed set
4 Let I be information of the discovered paths
5 Let cand be candidate input to next execution
6 cand = randomPick(S)
7 cand.minimized = f alse
8 while timeout or terminated manually do
9
c, w, i, eureka := exec(cand )
10
C =C ∪c
11
W =W ∪w
12
I=I∪i
13
if eureka then
14
S = S.insert(cand)
15
end
16
minimizedCand = cand
17
while ! cand.minimized do
18
minimizedCand = computeMinimization(minimizedCand)
19
C, W , I, S = exec(minimizedCand, C, W , I)
20
if minimizedCand == M then
21
cand.minimized = true
22
end
23
end
24
cand.score=computeScore(cand,I)
25
sortBySeedScoreAscOrder(S)
26
cand=computeMutation(S[0])
27 end
28 return C, W , S
will be stored into C, W , and I respectively. If there is a new path tracked by cand, eureka will be
true which represents a new path is found by executing chaincode with cand. When a new path is
found, current cand will be stored in S. Note that our approach integrated plugin to parse all internal
functions in the chaincode except Invoke and Init in with regular expression method. As the format
of chaincode input is strict to a certain type, i.e., {”Args” : [arg0, arg1, arg2...]}, in order to make
sure the input could walk through Init and Invoke and into the function that we would like to test
with fuzzer, first argument of the chaincode, such as arg0, must be exactly be a case string of switch
statement to guarantee appropriate input is generated. As for other arguments in generated input, the
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number and values of them are randomly generated to prevent bias caused by inputs in fuzz testing
process. Lastly, for each internal function, a certain number of inputs may be generated depending
on the user’s customization. With this plugin, we reduced the search space for randomly generating
initial inputs from scratch and focused on analyzing internal functions ignoring the effects from
Invoke and Init functions.
From line 15 to line 21, there are three functions to generate candidate input for next
execution cycle, computeMinimization, computeScore and computeMutation. each candidate will
first be mutated by minimization way to generate every another new candidate until candidates
cannot be minimized, all of the minimized candidates will be feeded in to chaincode for execution
and analysis. Then a score will be computed for the candidate that cannot be minimized with
function computeScore. Every input seed that has been executed with will have a score in factors
of crashes, warnings and path information in the path that this input triggered. Computed score
will help to decide which input is most promising candidate in terms of discovering a new path of
chaincode. After that, the set of inputs S is sorted by scores of inputs and the input with smallest
score will be given as mutation seed. With selected input, function computeMutation will generate
candidate input to next chaincode execution. We will describe details of computeMinimization,
computeScore and computeMutation in following paragraphs.
Function computeMinimization assists to explore candidate input’s potential in terms of discovering
new path, crashes and warnings. We adopted go-fuzz minimization theory to minimize candidate
input with minimization methods listed in table 4.1 and execute chaincode with each minimized
input. There are three methods used to minimize candidate input: remove each individual byte,
remove each subset of bytes and replace each individual byte with ’0’.
Table 4.1: Minimization of candidate input

computeMinimization(cand) methods
Remove each individual byte
Remove each subset of bytes
Replace each individual byte with ’0’
For example of remove each subset of bytes, candidate input {”Args” : [”query”, ”a”, ”200”]}
would be firstly minimized into {”Args” : [”query”, ”a”]} , then {”Args” : [”query”]} and finally{”Args” :
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[]}. In afuzzer , the minimized input is set to {”Args” : []} and cand.minimized will be flagged as
true at this time. All method will be applied to candidate input to generate new input for execution.
Any crashes, warnings and new path information found in executions will also be stored in the C,
W , I respectively.

Function computeScore is designed to compute a score for each input and evaluate the potential of
the seed in terms of tracking a new path, which will eventually discover all crashes and warnings in
all paths of chaincode. The score will be used to decide which seed will be selected as mutation
candidate to pass to the computeMutation function. Therefore, computeScore will play key role in
our feedback guided fuzz analysis, which needs to be scrutinized carefully and designed finely.

Score(cand ) =

Σ(Times f /Complexity f )
Σ(Weightw ∗ Numberw )

where:
Score(cand ) = computed score for current input cand
Times f

= accumulated called times of invoked function f

Complexity f = function complexity of invoked function f by cand
Weightw

= weigh of warning of w

Numberw

= times of warning w reported in current path

Above algorithm shows how our approach compute scores for each candidate inputs. Basically, the score is affected by the times of functions are called, the complexity of functions,
customized weights of each types of warnings and the number of each type of warning that are
reported. As described in above algorithm variable definitions, Score is proportional to Times and
is inversely proportionally to another three factors, Complexity, Weight and Number. The thinking
behind these relations is: the candidate input that invoked under-investigated, more complicated
functions and reported more warnings should be selected as mutation seed. This is because through
insight regarding to software development, we observed that more complicated function will always
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have more number of paths, which needs continuously to be investigated. If the times of high
complexity function is less that, it also indicate the specific function needs to be further tested.
Nonetheless, the input that report more high-impact warnings should also be prioritized as next
mutation input seed. With consideration of this, the smaller score of input get, the more likely this
input is selected as mutation seed. Therefore, function sortBySeedScoreAscOrder is used to sort
the inputs by their scores to facility selecting the input that with smaller score.
More in details, as for Times, invoked times of each function will be recorded in each
execution. The more a function is invoked, the less likely the input that will invoke this function is
selected as mutation seed. To compute the Complexity, we adopted cyclomatic complexity [71] as
function complexity measurement, which shows as following:

Complexity( f ) =




1

if complexity is 0 initially



Complexity( f ) + 1

if found ’if’,’for’,’case’,’&&’,’||’

Moreover, Weight is a set of customizable pre-defined values for each type of warnings. It
combined with the number of warning of each type, Number, affect the score of input as well. More
details about warnings will presents in section 4.4.

Function computeMutation is similar with function computeMinimization to mutate the given
input seed. There are 20 mutation strategies applied in computeMutation as methods, which shows
in table 4.2. One mutation method will be selected each time randomly to mutate the input. Note
that the generated mutation will be discarded if the test case has been generated previously or is a
minimized input, i.e., {”Args” : []} in afuzzer .

When fuzzing process is terminated, crashes, warnings and input seeds(combined with
initial seeds as well as generated seed during fuzzing) will be stored for further analysis. Besides
minimization and mutation’s assistance to mutate the input, there’s another structure mutation also
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Table 4.2: Mutation of candidate input

computeMutation(cand) methods
Remove a range of bytes.
Insert a range of random bytes
Duplicate a range of bytes
Copy a range of bytes
Random bit flip
Set a byte to a random value
Swap 2 bytes
Add/subtract from a byte
Add/subtract from a uint16
Add/subtract from a uint32
Add/subtract from a uint64
Replace a byte with an random value
Replace an uint16 with an random value
Replace an uint32 with an random value
Replace an ascii digit with another digit
Replace a multi-byte ASCII number with another number
Splice another input
Insert a part of another input
Insert a random literal
Replace a random literal
improved the efficiency of input mutation, which is described in next sub section in details.

4.3.5

Input Mutation

The execution step is iterative since multiple inputs will be generated continuously based on original
input corpus, mutation(bitflip) algorithm and chaincode execution feedback. They will be input
into the chaincode to check if crash happens. Any crash that happens will be recorded. Note that
an input filter is necessary to only pass the satisfied input to the chaincode since go-fuzz does not
provide API to generate complicated structure inputs.
Low-level implies in where the valid input will guide the generation of next input. It
utilized the metadata from chaincode instrumentation in last step and help to mutate the input
in low level, such as the mutation from input of {”Args” : [”update”, ”a”, ”200”]} to input of
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{”Args” : [”update”, ”a1”, ”2000”]}, which mutates current input and generate a non-structure
mutation.
Besides the lower-lever input mutation based on metadata of instrumentation, there’s another
high-level input mutation design inside go-fuzz, which name is Versifier. Versifier is based on the
reverse engineering algorithm that can recognize current input and learn from the validation of
current input. Versifier does four steps:
• Catch current input.
• Figure out if current input is a valid.
• Check out if current input can be take into consideration in increased priority or in lower
priority.
• Based on above steps, decide whether add current input to the corpus of fuzz testing, and then
mutate the current input with a certain direction.
Assuming a current input is {” f unction name”, ”arg1”, ”arg2”} in a form of {string, int, int},
Versifier detects and stores the current input. Versifier will firstly check if current input should be
stored into corpus or not based on policy setting. Then Versifier will go on to generate next input. If
current input is valid, then Versifier will more likely mutate next input with current form. Otherwise,
if the current input is invalid, then Versifier may consider to generate next input in another form,
such as {string, int, string} or {int, int}.
With effective input mutation, the procedure of analysis execution is a iterative event. There’s
a execution report will be printed on screen in a customizable time interval. The time interval is set
to 3 seconds by default. At the beginning of the execution, user can set the number of workers for
the execution and wall time for terminating the fuzzing execution. Then in each interval, the number
of corpus, crashes, restarts and executions will be reported. The cover in the figure represents how
many statements are executed in the chaincode so far.
While in the process of fuzz execution of the chaincode, each unique tracked path will be
saved into designated location. Our approach can apply warning analysis method on each stored
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path information to figure out if there’s any warnings. Note that the analysis method does not have
to wait until the end of the fuzz execution but generate warning report during the process of fuzz
execution.

4.4

Warning Oracle

As a part of path information that stored in the process of execution, a coverage profile is generated
for each new discovered path. Coverage profiles are kept in the form of golang coverage profile and
can be used directly to generate coverage statistics with go cover tool [4]. The benefit of selecting
this form is that it can be natively supported by official golang coverage analysis tool as well as
other open source tools that support this format.
Besides the well-supported third-party coverage statistic tools, we followed the factory
design pattern and designed a oracle factory to provide 10 types of warnings to analysis path that
are executed and tested. Table 4.3 shows the list of vulnerabilities supported to be detected by our
approach. The oracle factory also provides extension capability to allow further adding warning
detection, working as plugin.
To better illustrate each vulnerabilities, we manually design a chaincode in Fig. 4.9 to present
the each warnings and show the positions where the warnings are.
Global Variable Usage Global variables in chaincode are not saved on ledger of blockchain but
just belonging to a single node. If this node is down, then the value of global variable will be reset
Table 4.3: List of security warnings
Global Variable
Blacklisted imports
Concurrency of Program
Field Declarations
Map range iterations
Unhandled Errors
Unchecked Input Arguments
Read After Write
Range Query Risk
Cross Channel Invocation

Global variable used in chaincode.
Libraries which allow communication with the outside world, grant file access or
can introduce non-determinism are used.
Concurrency that may causes non-deterministic behavior such as race condition exists.
Field declared at structure of chaincode.
Map object as key value is returned in a random order in iterating through range operator.
Ignore return values related to errors. Not all errors are handled.
Input arguments are not checked to prevent from out-of-bound error.
Read a value after write may cause reading output inconsistent when read and
write are non-atomic.
Two functions to call range query cause phantom read of the ledger.
Call chaincode across the channels where data are not handled correctly.
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and cause inconsistent over all other peers. To prevent from this issue, global variable should not be
used to read or write the ledger, or other operations should not depend on the global variables.
For example, gv0, gv1 and blocks are global variables that declared in the chaincode.
Meanwhile, gv0 is read and write at line 41 in Fig. 4.9. As result, the read and write location of gv0
will be reported as Global Variable Usage warning.
Blacklisted imports Using external libraries may bring inconsistent into the chaincode, such as time
and math/rand, which will bring a time dependent value and generate random value. respectively.
For example, library time is imported into the chaincode and a external function time.Now()
is used at line 39. This will cause endorsing peers not compute the same result from using a
non-determinism function. With inconsistent computation, then the transaction may be invalid.
Concurrency of Program Using go currency function in the chaincode may lead to non-deterministic
behavior, especially in read and write ledger operation. This results in non-consistent behavior
amongst peers. Thus the go concurrency function should not be used in the chaincode.
From line 38 and 39 in Fig. 4.9, the concurrency usage of function1 may cause the data race
issue in writing the different value into ledger. In this case, any path that tracked line 38 and 39 will
be reported that contains Concurrency of Program warning.
Field Declarations The chaincode object is created once when setting up the chaincode at first time.
If chaincode object contains fields, then it is possible to sustain a global state in the program. Since
these global states are not stored on the ledger, the chaincode object should not contain any fields.
At line 8, VE is declared as global chaincode structure, and includes two members, dummyv
and dummyw. These two members may not sustain global state in chaincode because these global
states are not stored on ledger. So it may cause inconsistency in the state of VE. As a result, a Field
Declarations warning will be reported with VE’s information.
Map range iterations As shown in Fig. 4.2 as well as line 24 in Fig. 4.9, the global map object
blocks will cause this type of warning because of iteration over the entries of a map is not deterministic in execution of chaincode. Therefore, a Map range iterations warning will be warning to the
user warning
Unhandled Errors In golang, the output of a function does not have to be saved to certain variable,
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shown as line 43 in Fig. 4.9. The function1’s return values consists of two error type values. The
first error return value is ignored with a underscore at line 43, which represent this value is not
necessary in future operation. However, sometimes it is import to capture all errors and set related
resolution to errors. So, there’s a Unhandled Errors warning reported at Line 42 by our approach.
Unchecked Input Arguments For the chaincode invocation, the arguments of invocation is set as
an array form and input into the Invoke function. If the length of the arguments are not checked
with bound, then an out-of-bound error may happens. For example, args0[2] is used function0 at
line 42. Since the length of args0 is not guarded to be guaranteed to larger than 3. Then Unchecked
Input Arguments should be reported as the number of chaincode arguments must be checked before
usage to prevent from out-of-bound error.
Read After Write Read After Write warning is actually a data dependence issue which is due to the
read and write operation is not atomic. The operation through PutState or GetState will always be
through a transaction. In this case, GetState may return the old value from the ledger. For example,
in line 21 and 22 of Fig. 4.9, PutState write a key-value pair to the ledger and GetState read this
key-value pair from ledger. However, because they are in the same transaction, a new value caused
by PutState may not affect the return value of GetState and GetState will return a old value. In this
case, a Read After Write warning will be reported.
Range Query Risk The data reading from chaincode API GetHistoryOfKey or GetQueryResult
will cause phantom reads, which will cause inconsistancy if the data is used to update ledger. For
example, at line 19 and line 21, the value of data is coming from the GetHistoryOfKey function, it
should not be written on the ledger. In this case, the Range Query Risk warning will be reported.
Cross Channel Invocation channel value in InvokeChaincode(chaincodeName string, args [][]byte,
channel string) should not be any arbitrary value except value of GetChannelID(). Otherwise same
channel chaincode call will not be guaranteed. If channel is not the same channel of caller chaincode,
the transaction is just a ”Query” and any state update that are made through chaincode will not work
properly.
For example, there is a Cross Channel Invocation warning at line 56. If the value of channel
is set to the value other than the value of channel of current chaincode itself. Thus current chaincode
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across the different channels to call another chaincode through stub.InvokeChaincode, which may
cause error on the global states.
For each chaincode, following outputs will be provided as a result set: coverage profile,
warnings statistics, includes numbers of each types and locations, and crashes profile, includes
trigger input argument and panic stack information.

4.5

Experiment and Evaluation

Based on the design of our approach, we implemented afuzzer , which consists of 4 main module
components: Policy generation module, Instrumentation module, Fuzz execution module and
Warning analysis module. Fig. 4.10 shows general structure of the tool. Each module has following
functions:
• Policy generation module: Generate policy file according to the chaincode source code.
• Instrumentation module: Generate control flow graph and instrumentation source code and
binaries.
• Fuzz execution module: Execute chaincode with mutated inputs iteratively, generate path
information and store crashes information.
• Warning analysis module: Analyze warnings in each path and coverage rate of fuzzing test.
In order to evaluate the contribution of afuzzer , we designed the experiment to evaluate afuzzer and answer following research questions(RQ) in order to guarantee its robustness,
soundness, efficiency and effectiveness.
• RQ1: How’s the efficiency of afuzzer ? Fuzz testing is a test method focusing on generating
valid/reasonable inputs as faster as possible. In this case, testing efficient is the first important
standard that needs to be evaluated.
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• RQ2: How’s the effectiveness of afuzzer ? High coverage rate is another evaluation standard
that we care about. High coverage rate implies high percentage of the chaincode has been
tested. In order to find more implicit vulnerabilities and warnings, we designed this RQ and
would like to answer by evaluating the testing coverage rate of each chaincode.
• RQ3: Will the afuzzer find out crashes and give sufficient warnings to users?
Experiment Setting We did the experiment on a platform of 64bit MacOS 10.14 with
Hyperledger Fabric golang SDK 1.4 version and golang 1.12.1 version. From hardware perspective,
all experiment has been done with an Intel Core i5-8400(4.0 GHz, 6 cores) and 16 GB of DDR4
2600 RAM.
Experiment benchmarks In order to answer above RQs and evaluate afuzzer , we collected
Hyperledger Fabric chaincodes from multiple sources. Due to the nature of Hyperledger Fabric
as consortium blockchain, there’s no reliable method to collect all of existing chaincodes on all
Hyperledger Fabric chains. For the purpose of collect as many chaincodes as possible, we focused
on collecting the official examples and demonstration cases that are designed and contributed by the
active entrepreneurs supporters and chaincode developers. We collect and manage these chaincodes
as a benchmark suite as they has high possibility in being used in private Hyperledger Fabric chains.
As a result, we collected 24 chaincode benchmarks and organized these chaincodes as shown in
table 4.4. Noted that these tested chaincodes includes the cases that consists of single chaincode
and that consists of multiple chaincode files. We continued to analyze the chaincode benchmarks
that consists of multiple files for the purpose of evaluation.
In Fig. 4.4, the first and second columns on the left lists indexes and names of the chaincodes
that are fuzz tested with afuzzer . All of them are collected through 3 sources: official Hyperledger
Fabric chaincode tutorials offered by IBM [8], general open source libraries and most forked chaincode projects on open source platform. We managed them into a chaincode set as our benchmark
suite, which is utilized to evaluate afuzzer and answer RQs.

RQ1: Efficiency: To evaluate the efficiency of afuzzer , we firstly tested benchmark suite in two
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Table 4.4: Analysis report on evaluated chaincodes
Index

Name

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

cashloan/cash
cashloan/loan
crowdfunding/
drug/
eventsender/
example01/
example02/
example03/
example04/
example05/
fabcar/
farm/
maps/
marbles chaincode/
morpheo/
mrtgexchg/
passthru/
sleeper/
fabric test/maps.go
fabric test/mapkeys.go
fabric test/samplecc/
fabric test/sbe/
fabric test/shim-vendored/
fabric test/shimApiDriver/

Explored paths
1 min 10 min
17
49
10
10
10
10
10
10
6
6
2
5
6
12
2
5
9
11
8
8
10
10
51
127
60
86
41
267
32
77
37
156
5
5
6
8
14
18
26
37
7
9
39
39
9
9
9
9

Coverage rate
1 min
10 min
73.00% 80.90%
75.30% 75.30%
80.20% 80.20%
65.40% 65.40%
71.90% 71.90%
73.30% 83.30%
79.60% 87.20%
76.50% 85.30%
75.60% 78.00%
49.00% 49.00%
74.30% 74.30%
47.20% 51.90%
59.40% 59.40%
51.20% 53.80%
62.40% 64.20%
69.10% 79.60%
76.50% 76.50%
78.40% 78.40%
56.10% 58.20%
54.70% 56.00%
82.10% 82.10%
75.50% 75.50%
61.20% 61.20%
81.40% 81.40%

Crashes
1 min 10 min
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
2
2
0
0
0
0
6
6
1
1
0
0
2
2
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Warnings
1 min 10 min
0
0
0
0
5
5
0
0
0
0
5
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
3
3
7
7
3
3
8
8
1
1
0
0
2
2
4
4
6
6
0
0
3
3
0
0
1
1

Initial inputs

LOC

3
2
5
5
2
1
3
1
3
2
5
10
15
13
10
14
2
2
6
11
2
3
3
5

283
166
259
235
91
72
177
81
155
196
203
745
464
754
1059
722
71
123
203
305
180
150
237
212

group of wall time limit, 1 minute and 10 minutes, in order to check out two hypothesis: Will the
number of explored paths increase with increased time period? Can afuzzer could explore many
paths of the program in a minimal time period? To check these two hypothesis, based on data on the
Explored paths and Coverage rate columns, the statistics of experiment are presented and grouped
with wall time length on both columns. Note that the coverage rate represent the statement coverage
rate which collected based on the explored paths information.
For all the chaincodes in Fig. 4.4, the number of explored paths are all identical or increased
when the wall time extended from 1 minute to 10 minute. The increment of explored paths numbers
represent afuzzer can guarantee test and explore the chaincode continuously. Meanwhile, for the
chaincodes No.2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 17, 22, 23, 24, the number of explored paths are same in both
1 min and 10 min wall time setting and the value of coverage rate are same too. This situation
indicate that afuzzer can finish testing these chaincodes in minimal time since the coverage rate
won’t increase even if the wall time extended. Thus, afuzzer can efficiently explore as many paths
as possible in a minimal time period.
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Moreover, for the chaincodes No.13, 18, 21, the number of explored paths are increased
while the coverage rate keep identical. This case represent that the statement of chaincode has been
explored thoroughly but the branch coverage are still increasing. Following figure shows a small
example to further explain this case:
Assuming there are two group of inputs: a=1, b=1 and a=-1,b=-1, thus the line 1,2,6,7 are
explored with a=1, b=1 and the line 3,4,8,9 are explored with a=-1, b=-1. At the end, all of the
statements are explored and statement coverage rate is 100%. However, if we continue to provide
another group of inputs, a=1, b=-1, then the line 1,2,8,9 are explored. A new path is explored while
the statements explored keep the same.
With the explanation of above examples, afuzzer can continuously and efficiently test the
chaincode even if statements has been explored.

RQ2: Effectiveness: We evaluate the effectiveness based on the value of coverage rate of each
chaincode. Fig. 4.11 shows the coverage rate for each chaincode in 1 minute and 10 minute time
frame. The average of coverage rate is 68.64% for 1 minute and 71.21% for 10 minutes, which
presents quite reasonable effectiveness of afuzzer .

RQ3: Crashes and Warnings: According to the statistics in Fig.4.4, afuzzer can detect crashes
and give warnings to user in a timely manner like 1 minute and also could find out the bug that hided
deeply in the chaincode in longer time frame, like 10 minutes. To further analysis the features of
these crashes and warnings, we categorize them, respectively, according to the types and definitions
described in section 4.4 and show the result in table 4.5 and table 4.6. Note that the warning
categories that does not have any warnings in chaincodes are ignored.
As the date shown in table 4.5, for most of crashes generated during the experiment, we
found they are caused by two reason: 1, for the index out of range crashes, it commonly happens
when one of argument in argument array is read without checking its existence or length of the
argument array. This crash reason is closely connected with the Unchecked Argument warning. 2,
for the invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference caused crashes, the reason behind it is that
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1 func Fuzz ( data [] byte ) int {
2
if len ( data ) == 0 {
3
return -1
4
}
5
var inp interface {}
6
if err := json . Unmarshal ( data , & inp ) ; err != nil {
7
return -1
8
}
9
if inp .( type ) != map [ string ] interface {} {
10
return -1
11
}
12
mp := inp .( map [ string ] interface {})
13
argmp := make ( map [ string ] interface {})
14
for a := range mp {
15
argmp [ strings . ToLower ( a ) ] = mp [ a ]
16
}
17
_ , argsPresent := argmp [ " args " ]
18
_ , funcPresent := argmp [ " function " ]
19
if ! argsPresent || ( len ( mp ) == 2 && ! funcPresent ) || len ( mp ) > 2 {
20
return 0
21
}
22
23
scc := new ( ME )
24
stub := shim . NewMockStub ( " chaincodeName " , scc )
25
// optional if Init needs test or Invoke depends on initi alizati on
26
stub . MockInit ( " uuid " , [][] byte {[] byte ( " Init " ) , [] byte ( " a " ) ,[] byte ( " 200 " ) })
27
stub . MockInvoke ( " uuid " , t oA rg sB y te Ar ra y ( argmp ) )
28
29
return 1
30 }

Figure 4.3: Policy file for Motivating example

Table 4.5: Crash result
Name
cashloan/loan
example04/
example05/
maps/
marbles chaincode/
mrtgexchg/
passthru/
sleeper/
fabric test/maps.go
fabric test/mapkeys.go
Total

index out of range
1min
1
0
0
4
1
0
0
0
1
1
8

10min
1
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
1
2
8

invalid memory address or
nil pointer dereference
1min
10min
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
11
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SIGABRT
1min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1

Total
1 min
2
1
2
6
1
2
1
0
1
1
17

10 min
2
2
2
6
1
2
1
1
1
2
20

Figure 4.4: Control flow graph of chaincode in Fig. 4.2
Table 4.6: Warning result
Name
crowdfunding/
example01/
fabcar/
farm/
maps/
marbles chaincode/
morpheo/
mrtgexchg/
sleeper/
fabric test/maps.go
fabric test/mapkeys.go
fabric test/sbe/
fabric test/shimApiDriver/
Total

GlobalVariable
Usage
1min 10min
5

Blacklisted
Import
1min 10min

Unhandled
Error
1min 10min
5
5

Unchecked
Argument
1min 10min

1

6

RangeQuery
Risk
1min 10min

8
1
1
1

1

ReadAfter
Write
1min 10min

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
8

1
8

3

3

5

5

1
1
2

1
1
2

1
9

12

12

1
3

3

2

2

2

2

2
3

2
3

9

9

3

3

2

2

6

6

3

3

Total
1min
5
5
1
3
7
3
8
1
2
4
6
3
1
44

10min
5
8
1
3
7
3
8
1
2
4
6
3
1
47

although the existence of the read argument is checked, developer did check if null can accepted
and transfer to the function.
From table 4.6, the largest number of warnings appear in unhandled error category, which
means it is quite common for chaincode developer to ignore handling all possible errors in the
chaincode program.

4.6

Related Works

With the closer attention to smart contract testing techniques from researchers, related researches
are recently proposed and published in smart contract verification area. In our approach, we
adopted fuzzing test and introduced it into smart contract verification research area. To the best of
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1 func ( t * ME ) query ( stub shim . ChaincodeStubInterface , args [] string ) pb . Response {
2
_afuzzer_dep_ . CoverTab [51928]++
3
if len ( args ) > 3 {
4
_afuzzer_dep_ . CoverTab [56144]++
5
c ha in Cod eT oC al l := args [1]
6
queryKey := args [2]
7
channel := args [3]
8
invokeArgs := to Ch a in co de A rg s ( " query " , queryKey )
9
10
stub . In vo k eC ha in c od e ( chainCodeToCall , invokeArgs , channel )
11
} else {
12
_afuzzer_dep_ . CoverTab [27618]++
13
}
14
_afuzzer_dep_ . CoverTab [61116]++
15
return shim . Success ([] byte ( " Query success " ) )
16 }

Figure 4.5: Snippet of instrumented chaincode in Fig. 4.2

1 func ( t * ME ) Invoke ( stub shim . C h a i n c o d e S t u b I n t e r f a c e ) pb . Response {
2
function , args := stub . G e t F u n c t i o n A n d P a r a m e t e r s ()
3
if function == " invoke " { // {" Args ":[" invoke " , args ...]}
4
return t . invoke ( stub , args )
5
} else if function == " update " { // {" Args ":[" update " , args ...]}
6
return t . update ( stub , args )
7
} else if function == " query " { // {" Args ":[" query " , args ...]}
8
return t . query ( stub , args )
9
}
10
return shim . Error ( " Invalid function name " )
11 }

Figure 4.6: inputs that can call private functions

1
2
3
4
5
6

// Assuming input i is in type of integer
if i * i >= 0 {
// statement 1
} else if i * i < 0 {
// statement 2
}

Figure 4.7: difference between statical and dynamical CFG generation

1 if v1 != v2 {
2
return " Error "
3 }
4 return " Success "

Figure 4.8: Example for sonar instrumentation
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25
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import (
" fmt "
" github . com / hyperledger / fabric / core / chaincode / shim "
" github . com / hyperledger / fabric / protos / peer "
" time "
)
type VE struct {
dummyv string
dummyw string
}
var blocks = map [ int ] int {1:1 ,2:5 ,3:10 ,4:50 ,}
var gv0 int = 111
var gv1 = 222
func function1 ( stub shim . ChaincodeStubInterface , data string ) ( e0 error , e1 error ) {
iterator , _ := stub . G e t H is t o r y F o r K e y ( " key " )
data , _ := iterator . Next ()
stub . PutState ( " key " , [] byte ( data . Value ) )
stub . GetState ( " key " )
returnValue := 0
for i , ii := range blocks {
returnValue = returnValue * i - ii
}
args1 := stub . GetStringArgs ()
if len ( args1 ) < 1 {
fmt . Println ( " working guard " )
return e1 , e0
}
_ , e1 = stub . GetState ( args1 [2])
return e0 , e1
}
func ( t * VE ) function0 ( stub shim . C h a i n c o d e S t u b I n t e r f a c e ) {
args0 := stub . GetStringArgs ()
go function1 ( stub , " data1 " )
go function1 ( stub , " data2 " )
fmt . Println ( time . Now () )
gv0 = gv0 + 1
resultT , _ := stub . GetState ( args0 [2])
_ , e1 := function1 ( stub , " data " )
fmt . Println ( e1 )
}
func ( m * VE ) Init ( stub shim . C h a i n c o d e S t u b I n t e r f a c e ) peer . Response {
return shim . Success ([] byte ( " Init Success " ) )
}
func ( m * VE ) Invoke ( stub shim . C h a i n c o d e S t u b I n t e r f a c e ) peer . Response {
m . function0 ( stub )
_ , args := stub . G e t F u n c t i o n A n d P a r a m e t e r s ()
c ha in Cod eT oC al l := args [1]
channel := args [2]
stub . In vo k eC ha in c od e ( chainCodeToCall , [][] byte {} , channel )
return shim . Success ([] byte ( " Invoke Success " ) )
}
func main () {
if err := shim . Start ( new ( VE ) ) ; err != nil {
fmt . Printf ( " Error starting chaincode : % s " , err )
}
}

Figure 4.9: Vulnerabilities explaination example
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Figure 4.10: Overall workflow of afuzzer
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Figure 4.11: Chaincode coverage rate

knowledge, we systemly looked in the research works that focusing on (1)fuzzing test[31, 48, 49, 69]
and (2)smart contract verification approaches, especially those works that aims to verify Hyperledger
Fabric chaincode.
Fuzzing [84] test’s aim to execute target program and monitor runtime status by feeding
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inputs that are generated during the executions. The most challenges are (1)how to generate effective
inputs and (2) how to increase the code coverage. American fuzzy lop(AFL) [95] is tool designed
to solve these two questions and has been proved as efficient and extended as basis to multiple
toolsbohme2017coverage,bohme2017directed. To generate effiective inputs, AFL maintains a
minimum input queue by trimming the inputs that will not change the program behavior. New
inputs are mutated iteratively through customized fuzzing strategies and pushed into the input queue.
If any input triggers a new path that is not explored, then related output will be recorded. This
coverage-oriented fuzzing test theory inspired following fuzzing test tools as well as our approach,
to test different programs on various platforms. afuzzer take advantages of mutation based fuzzing
test tool [6] focusing on golang that based on AFL theory. Beyond that, we introduced new method
to validate the inputs and integrated vulnerability warning into the afuzzer for the purpose of
providing one-stop fuzzing test service to users.
Smart contract theory is introduced two decades ago[85] and brought into public sightseeing
since the popularity of bitcoin[73] raised. Most recent smart contract testing and verification
researches are aggregating on Ethereum[28] platform with formal verification techniques, including
symbolic execution and fuzz testing. Luu et al.[68] for the first time introduced symbolic execution method into smart contract verification. In this approach, loop interations and relations
among functions are not considered during the symbolic execution procedure. Zeus[58] persuaded
translating smart contract into llvm[64] and thus can be integrated with llvm based program verification tool to test smart contracts. Similar research logic, translate smart contract into other
language then tested with existing tool, is also applied in other tools[21, 52]. Besides symbolic
execution, fuzzing test is another practical method in testing vulnerabilities of smart contract.
ContractFuzzer[55] and echidna[5] are utilizing fuzz testing techniques to verify Ethereum smart
contracts. In contractFuzzer, fuzz testing is introduced to test smart contract for the first time, and 7
types of vulnerabilities can be detected. However, inputs are totally generated based on the source
code and no input improvement could be guided to increase coverage rate due to lack of input
mutation analysis.
For the perspective of Hyperledger Fabric chaincode testing, there are few researches presents
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practical verification methods integrating with formal verification techniques. As references of
analysis of chaincode security, in [3], authors presents tool to static analyze chaincode to investigate
9 types of vulnerabilities and send warnings to users. This is research provide insights to analyze
dynamic analysis of chaincode and its theory is inherited by [94], which extend the detection
capability beyond the investigated types of vulnerabilities. To the best of our knowledge, there’s
no other fuzzing test basis, even formal method basis chaincode verification platform existing or
proposed yet.

4.7

Conclusion

In this work, we propose the first Hyperledger Fabric chaincode fuzzer to bring insight to chaincode
developer with signals and alerts of when and how they should start focusing on verify security of
chaincode in order to increase the software quality.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Works
In the researches that are throughout my Ph.D. years, I always focus on the software qulity and
verification. Software quality should always be top priority in the life cycle of the software
development.
In the research of memory reuse distance, We repurpose PCT algorithm to mitigate path
explosion problems in analyzing concurrent program and take its advantage to measure memory
distance in an effective way with probabilistic guarantees and without losing its generality.
Blockchain is gradually becoming a hot research topic in research area, especially the
software quality of smart contract. Smart contract is a evolutional software category built upon
the blockchain platform, which has been well-accepted in voting, crowdfunding and broadcasting
area due to information transparency and traceability. However, in most recent years, there are
plenty of attacks that caused huge economic losses. The notorious DAO attack make the Ethereum
owner suffer a loss of $60 M. More hazardously, the same type of attack that had been discovered
and happened, which cannot be prevented completely. With insight of huge potential and market
caps, I committed time into this promising research area and is concentrating on following research
projects.
Hyperledger fabric is a another promising blockchain platform that maintained by Linux
foundation. It has great features on distribution and privacy which are the reason of being widely
accepted and applied in business industry. It’s smart contract, chaincode, designed with upgradeable
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and high maintainable status, which is also extensively utilized and integrated into the business
system.
With the development and adoption of Hyperledger fabric, there’s incremental demands for
the security analysis. However, the security of Hyperledger fabric unfortunately, hasn’t not gain
much attention from neither industry nor research area. Noticing this surging security requests
and driven by curiosity of software security research on chaincode, I developed an approach for
automated analyzing chaincode vulnerabilities with fuzz testing, which is proved as a quality
software testing technique to discover software security issues.
To the best of our knowledge, I didn’t find any effective fuzzing analysis tool that can
truly verify chaincodes security issues and detect chaincode vulnerabilities and crashes. There
are researches that focused on static analysis for Hyperledger fabric chaincode. However, there’re
natural limitations to statically analyze program as static analysis cannot prove the found warnings
really exist in runtime or could lead to runtime bug in practical. Moreover, static analysis also bring
high amount of false positive and false negative in analysis result.
In the future, my current researches can be extended into new platform such as Libra smart
contract test with static analysis and symbolic execution technique
Libra is another blooming blockchain platform introduced by Facebook, aiming to establish
a safe, unbounded crypto-currency exchange platform, which will assist research and applications
from any areas.
This project is, on one hand, very promising and worth research due to the increment of
smart contract vulnerabilities and necessities of the audit verification, and application prospects as
introduced by Facebook, who taken up large share of market and embraced 2.45 billion monthly
active users in 2019. On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, there’s no any existing tools
focusing on libra smart contract, which is written by move.
I propose a state-of-the-art libra smart contract testing framework with integration of static
analysis and symbolic execution technique. This framework will automatically explore the security
issues hidden inside the smart contracts and will definitely help both researchers and developers to build more safely smart contract, bring broader impact on the research on smart contract
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vulnerabilities verification and attracts the investment from both scientific foundation and industries.
In testing concurrent software program, the difficulties are that I couldn’t predict the inputs
of the concurrent software program and which path or state will the concurrent software program
will be in. So It is very hard to test a concurrent program because not only inputs have to be
enumerated exhaustively but also program path interleaving states are very hard to predict.
In my future research plans, I will focus on blockchain cybersecurity area and other interesting research areas that can assist solving questions in software testing area better and more
effectively. Contributing on current research projects, blockchain smart contract testing will be my
research topic in next three years in order to generate applicable software testing application for
most financially promising blockchain platforms and attract external funding from national funding
supporter as well as industry companies. Besides considerations of research financial support, I will
also evaluate my researches’ impact to my community research institutes in terms of education and
research activities, such as holding and joining research conferences. I will make contributions to
my beloved software verification research area in the future.
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